A region without air service? Some Middle East airports face the prospect as political tensions rise

A region without air services? Some Middle East airports face that prospect as political tensions rise

It is often said that the first casualty of war is truth. But right up there with it is commercial air travel.

It wasn't always thus.

At one time it would not concern international airlines that they were flying too close to hostilities. The danger then came from a tiny handful of rogue, renegade military fighter pilots, and it was considered unlikely that even they would not mistake a commercial airliner for an adversary.

KAL007, a Korean Air Boeing 747, was shot down over Russian airspace in Sep-1983 en route between Anchorage and Seoul - by a Soviet fighter pilot who mistook it for a 'spy plane'.

That event began to change that perception.

But it was not until the destruction of flight MH17 from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur in Jul-2014, over the occupied (by Russian Separatist Forces) Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, that it became evident that the nature of the danger had shifted dramatically.

No longer was such an action left to the discretion of a fighter pilot who at least had eyes on the commercial airliner, and could make a strike decision accordingly.

MH17 was downed by a Buk 9M38 surface-to-air missile fired from more than 30.000ft below on the ground, by people who could not have known exactly what they were firing at; just a tiny little diamond in the sky and a couple of contrails.

The legal repercussions of that action rumble on a decade later, but it was immediately evident that commercial flights must not be allowed to go anywhere near war zones. And the dangers are not restricted to ancient Soviet missiles any longer either; they include much smarter missiles that can be fired from much longer distances, some from the shoulder, and, increasingly - drones.

Accordingly, airlines had begun cancelling and rescheduling services in anticipation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24-Feb-2022.

No commercial flights in Ukraine for two and a half years

There have been no commercial flights in Ukraine since.

Ukrainians and those visiting the country use a variety of alternative airports, such as Rzeszow in eastern Poland (which had its best-ever year, with over one million passengers in 2023, and where there was a further 10% growth in 1H2024).

And it isn't only Ukraine that is affected.

The live flight chart below from the late afternoon of 14-Aug-2024 shows no flight activity in southern Belarus either, in the Crimea region seized by Russia since 2014. Nor in the western provinces of Russia, where the Ukrainian army is currently involved in a military incursion into the Kursk Oblast, with other oblasts like Belgorod and Bryansk possibly threatened.

It is a huge black hole for flights that is probably visible from the Moon.

Airspace restrictions mean that commercial flights are avoiding overflying Ukraine

Source: Flightradar24.com

Extension of the hostilities that began on 07-Oct-2023 continues to escalate

Fast forward to the dreadful day of 07-Oct-2023 in Israel. The equally dreadful events since, in Israel Gaza, the West Bank and other areas. A localised conflict that now runs the risk of escalating into a full-blown regional crisis enveloping Israel, Lebanon and Iran, not to mention the missiles that are being fired hundreds of miles up the Red Sea from Yemen across commercial airspace by the rebel Houthi movement.

Any airline manager with responsibility for the Middle East must be living on their nerves.

And as a direct consequence, airlines have been suspending services to airports in the affected region and also those so far not affected, including Tel Aviv, Beirut and Amman. There is no evidence yet of that trend extending to Iran, but it could easily do so.

Some of these suspensions are long ones, effectively service terminations.

Regional map of the Middle East

Source: Google maps.

Israel - Tel Aviv Ben Gurion Airport

Tel Aviv's airport could be attacked from any direction

Israel has been under consistent but sporadic drone, rocket and missile attack from Gaza and Lebanon for many years. This intensified following the events of 07-Oct-2024, and subsequent invasion of Gaza, to include Iran, which launched over 300 drones and missiles on 13-Apr-2024 in response to the Israeli bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Damascus, prompting a token response from Israel.

Latterly the Ansar Allah (Houthis) group in Yemen - which had previously restricted itself to attacks on Israeli-related merchant ships in the Red Sea and occasional attacks on Eilat - launched a single long range drone from 1,500km randomly targeted at Tel Aviv on 19-Jul-2024, one which evaded Israeli defences.

Thus, where Tel Aviv and its airport (which is very much a target) is concerned, potential attacks can come from any one of five directions - from Gaza to the south and west; from the West Bank to the east (comparatively rarely); from southern Lebanon; and now directly from Iran and Yemen. Any of these could involve enhanced weaponry that might evade Israel's multifaceted defences, including the 'Iron Dome'.

Normal operations of any airport under such circumstances is impossible to achieve.

Ben Gurion (TLV) is Israel's premier airport, and one of only two international ones.

The other, Eilat Timna Ramon, in the south of the country and inaugurated in 2019, is also the diversion airport for Ben Gurion.

Capacity currently down by 33%

TLV's overall seat capacity, ASKs/ASMs and departing frequencies are already running well behind that of 2022, 2023, and the benchmark pre-pandemic year of 2019.

The severe drop in seats from the week commencing 09-Oct-2023 is clear in the chart below, as well as a marked period of capacity recovery from the beginning of Mar-2024.

In the week commencing 12-Aug-2024 there were 445,305 scheduled seats in the inventory, compared to 662,935 in the same week of 2023, a shortfall of 33%.

Tel Aviv Ben Gurion International Airport: weekly total system seat capacity, from 2019

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG.

El Al apart, flag and legacy airlines are notable for their absence

It is perhaps not surprising that El Al, which has been handling threats for many decades, heads the list of airlines currently operating by capacity (and more so by movements).

Indeed, of the top five airlines, three are Israeli, accounting for almost 57% of capacity.

The largest non-Israeli airline is a Crete (Greece)-based charter airline (Bluebird), and the largest scheduled one is the LCC Wizz Air. The Greek Aegean Airlines is the eighth largest airline and Lufthansa is 10^th.

Other national flag carrier and legacy airlines are notable for their absence.

Tel Aviv Ben Gurion International Airport: system seats, all business models, for week commencing 12-Aug-2024

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG.

That lack of legacy/full service carriers means that 89% of all capacity is on unaligned airlines, further cutting off TLV from other countries.

However, utilisation at this reduced level of activity remains high, with seat capacity for take-off and landing still high in each block hour.

This is the chart for Thursday 15-Aug-2024.

Tel Aviv Ben Gurion International Airport: seats per hour for the week commencing 12-Aug-2024

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG.

Service suspensions are fluid, but some are long term already

The table below is of all known service suspensions as of 15-Aug-2024.

All are fluid in that they can change at a moment's notice. They are not listed alphabetically. At the time of writing, further attempts are being made to secure a ceasefire in Gaza, which would probably have an immediate impact on flight suspensions at Tel Aviv - although that is not certain.

If those attempts fail, it is highly likely that they will continue in the run-up to the US presidential election in early Nov-2024.

Flight suspensions at TLV

ITA Airways. Service suspension until 19-Aug-2024	Air Europa. Service suspension until 19-Aug-2024	Tarom. Service suspension until 16-Aug-2024 (also to Beirut and Amman)	Swiss. Service suspension until 21-Aug-2024 (also to Beirut
Austrian Airlines. Service suspension until 21-Aug-2024 (all Middle East destinations)	Aegean Airlines. Service suspension until 21-Aug-2024 (also to Beirut and Amman)	Brussels Airlines. Service suspension until 21-Aug-2024	Lufthansa. Service suspension until 21-Aug-2024.
United Airlines. Service suspension until further notice	EasyJet. Service suspension until Mar-2025.	Bulgaria Air. Service suspension until 06-Aug-2024. Now operating daylight hours only.	Delta Air Lines. Service suspension until 31-Aug-2024.

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation News Alerts

(Air India and Cathay Pacific have also suspended services, but precise details are unclear).

El Al trying to fill the gap

Interestingly, El Al, which as mentioned previously has gained an understanding over many years of how to handle these situations, increased seats to and from Israel by approximately 8,000 from 01-Aug-2024 to 07-Aug-2024.

This was to assist the return of Israelis stranded abroad due to the cancellation of services by foreign airlines. The airline added frequencies, including on Athens and Larnaca routes, and increased capacity on existing services.

Most of the foreign airline suspensions are of a short term nature, extendable as circumstances demand - but there will be concern about United and easyJet, both of which have instigated very long suspensions that are cancellations, in the sense that they indicate that major board-level decisions would have to be made before re-instigation of those services.

Beirut - Rafic Hariri International Airport

Flight suspensions to Beirut too, as a possible invasion of Lebanon looms

The other airport to be adversely impacted is Beirut, in the Lebanese capital.

Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and paramilitary group, is regarded as the most technically capable terrorist group in the world. It has recently been ramping up its missile attacks from its Lebanese bases, including one on an Israeli-occupied town in the Golan Heights in late Jul-2024, which prompted a response in which a senior Hezbollah commander said to be responsible for that attack was killed in Beirut.

With Israel having accomplished many, if not all, of its goals against Hamas in Gaza, there is the likelihood that it will now turn its attention to Hezbollah, which poses a greater threat and which, like Hamas, is funded by Iran.

That could mean a full scale invasion of Lebanon, as it has done twice before in 1982 (a strike against terrorist organisations such as the PLO and Abu Nidal organisation after the attempted assassination of the Israeli Ambassador to the UK) and 2006 (reaction to a Hezbollah incursion). In the latter case the Beirut airport was closed completely, following an Israeli strike.

Tensions are very high, and the Jul-2024 attack that killed many children gives Israel a greater incentive than previously. Local sentiment has it that it would seek to expel Hezbollah from Lebanon altogether.

In those circumstances it is unsurprising that airlines have already suspended services at Beirut's airport, even though there is no actual fighting, as such, yet.

Middle East Airlines is a survivor

Beirut is used to wars.

Lebanon's own civil war from 1975 onwards alone prompted Middle East Airlines (MEA, which was used to ferry thousands of visitors from the entire region to what was regarded as its 'playground') to store most of its aircraft away from Beirut; for example, in Cyprus.

MEA is a survivor. It remains in situ at Beirut's Rafic Hariri International Airport (BEY) with almost 40% of the capacity, but even then its flight operations right now are threatened by insurance risks.

Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport: system seats for all airlines, week commencing 12-Aug-2024

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Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG.

Beirut not badly affected so far, but its capacity levels are dropping fast

BEY has not yet been impacted by these events to the same degree as TLV.

In the week commencing 12-Aug-2024 system seat capacity stood at 204,185, which is slightly down on 2022 and 2023, and 30.4% down on 2019.

Beirut Rafic Hariri International Airport: weekly total system seat capacity, from 2019

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG.

The problem for BEY, though, is that it is not reversing a big drop in Oct-2023 as TLV is trying to. Its capacity profile dipped below that of 2022 at the end of Jul-2024, and looks as if it may do so again in the near future.

And that is merely on the threat of war. A full-scale invasion could see the complete closure of the airport, and probably the mass evacuation of MEA's aircraft again.

BEY does not count as a Middle East hub to the same degree as, say, Dubai or Doha, but it is one all the same, and its absence from the regional scene would be noticed.

As the TLV table above demonstrated, suspension of TLV services has in some cases been extended to BEY, and even to 'the Middle East' in general.

In all, CAPA - Centre for Aviation is aware of 13 airlines that have suspended service at BEY.

In most cases they are short term suspensions, and in some of them airlines have already indicated an intention to return - such as Air France (15-Aug projected return). In a couple of cases the suspensions are longer, such as Transavia (all of summer 2024, although that may now be revised).

Living on a knife edge

BEY hangs on a knife edge.

The current tensions might ease sufficiently for most airlines to resume normal service levels. But they will probably get worse rather than better, and even a ceasefire in Gaza would make no difference.

Hezbollah operates wholly independently of Hamas, has different objectives, and a larger fighting force and armaments. Funded by Iran, it could even overwhelm the 'Iron Dome' with missiles, which would make a full scale invasion by Israel an imperative.

Amman Queen Alia International Airport

Jordan could get dragged in, too

Amman, the capital of Jordan, has also been dragged into airline suspensions and cancellations.

It is not immediately clear why, but Jordan is a very rare beast in the region - a tacit Israeli ally. That alliance stems from the fact that Jordan has been savaged by regional wars in the past, and consequently now maintains careful diplomatic relations with Israel and its main ally, the US.

In Oct-1994 Jordan and Israel signed a peace treaty, normalising relations and resolving territorial disputes, even providing for broad cooperation in tourism and trade.

In Apr-2024 Jordan also shot down missiles fired at Israel from Iran while they were over its territory, "in order to protect its citizens".

Hence, there are numerous ways in which Jordan could get dragged into a wider Middle East conflict, even if it appears to be peripheral.

The Queen Alia International Airport has so far not felt the same impact as Tel Aviv and Beirut. Seat capacity in the week commencing 12-Aug-2024 was within 5% of the 2023 figure and 10% of 2019.

Four airlines are known to have suspended services.

In 1H2024 passenger numbers fell by 4.6% year-on-year, and aircraft movements by the same amount, but cargo increased by 23.5%.

Those above are the three main cities and countries affected by these events, but there are at least two others which potentially could be, according to actions taken or not taken by governments.

The main two are Iran and Qatar.

Iran - Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport weekly

Iran and Israel - old adversaries in a stand-off

Iran has already been dragged directly into the conflict by way of the aforementioned bombing of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria, on 01-Apr-2024, and the subsequent retaliation. This was Iran's first direct attack on Israel since the start of their proxy conflict, and it took the form of drones and missiles on 13-Apr-2024.

The Israeli response to that was a targeted strike on 19-Apr-2024 on an air defence facility within Iran, so precise as to prove that it could hit any target in Iran with impunity, and with little collateral damage.

Both of these strikes were at a comparatively low level, and both countries remain in a stand-off position. Neither would wish for open warfare.

However, the situation is made more complex: firstly, by the subsequent assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, a top leader of Hamas, by an explosive device covertly smuggled into the Tehran guesthouse where he was staying. Israel has not admitted to that attack.

Then subsequently, by Iran's capability to produce and deploy a nuclear weapon being closer to fruition by growing its stockpile of highly enriched uranium to levels unprecedented for a state without a nuclear weapons programme, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency. The timeline for the production of a nuclear weapon may be as short as six months, according to some estimates.

Israel is reputed to be heavily armed with nuclear weapons.

Iranian capacity holds steady for now

So far there is no discernible effect on capacity.

Levels throughout Iran, which has domestic problems to contend with as well as international ones, are similar to those of previous years and well ahead of 2023, while at the country's main gateway, Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport, they are currently approaching a high for the 2020s decade.

Tehran Imam Khomeini International Airport: weekly total system seats, from 2019

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG.

An assault by Israel targetting nuclear facilities and/or the main oil port terminals would change the outlook enormously, of course, quite apart from its impact on oil prices globally.

Qatar - Doha Hamad International Airport

Qatar-Israel relations are as good as they get in this part of the world, but any conflict with Iran could change that rapidly

Qatar sits in an odd position with regard to Israel.

The two countries established unofficial trade relations in 1996, Qatar being the first among all nations of the Arabian Peninsula, concurrently with the Israel-Jordan peace treaty.

Although that trade bond was subsequently broken, the countries have established and maintained arms-length diplomatic relations, despite Qatar having been a financial supporter of Hamas (not Hezbollah).

Indeed, it is believed that in 2011 the US government requested that Qatar provide a base for the Hamas leadership, in order to ease communications with the group. Subsequently its leadership was hosted there, including Ismail Haniyeh, who was assassinated in Tehran recently (see above). Qatar has been called Hamas' most important financial backer and foreign ally.

Also - that from 2018 to 2023 Israel's government enabled and approved of the Qatari support for Hamas, for political reasons.

But in May-2024 it was reported that the United States had urged Qatar to remove Hamas leaders from its territory if they declined to agree to a hostage deal with Israel.

Later, it was reported that Qatar was reviewing the future of Hamas' office in Doha as part of a broader evaluation of its role as a mediator in the Israel-Hamas war.

It was always unlikely that Israel would attempt to eliminate Hamas officials within Qatar, and these recent developments minimise that possibility further. Nor would an Israeli attack on Lebanon likely bring Qatar more directly into the conflict, as Qatar is not known to be a supporter of Hezbollah.

The most likely way in which Qatar might be involved is as a result of an Israeli attack on Iran.

The two countries have a close economic relationship that affects their diplomatic relations, particularly in the oil and gas industries. Iran and Qatar jointly control the world's largest natural gas field along their maritime border, and in addition they co-operate in the shipping sector.

Qatar generally refrains from criticising Iran's domestic and foreign activities, and has held several high-level meetings with Iranian officials to discuss security and economic agreements.

Doha recording record figures right now

So far there is no negative impact on Doha Hamad International Airport, which reported record passenger traffic in 2023 - almost 46 million, and with 22.5% growth in the first seven months of 2024; and capacity is also at an all-time high, with 1,290,000 seats in the week commencing 12-Aug-2024.

Doha Hamad International Airport: weekly total system seat capacity, week commencing 12-Aug-2024 (from 2019)

Source: CAPA - Centre for Aviation and OAG.

The situation could escalate in any one or more of numerous ways

The problem for the airlines operating in the region and its airports is that the situation is fluid, and it has expanded well beyond the initial conflict that arose after the events of 07-Oct-2024, (namely, the invasion of Gaza).

It could expand further, and rapidly.

For example, the Houthi attacks on shipping might be extended to commercial aircraft, such as cargo aircraft. Should that happen, passenger aircraft could be targeted by mistake. And aircraft could be hit by random missile and drone attacks at any time.

For the immediate future the airlines and airports have to contend with uncertainty, with most airlines imposing service suspensions on a daily or weekly basis and widening those suspensions geographically as required. But they might take easyJet's lead of a much longer-ranging suspension.

Airspace is shrinking

Some airlines have stopped flying over parts of the region altogether, especially Iran (and airlines having already been prevented from using Russian airspace), while others have been advised by governments not to enter Lebanese airspace.

The same 'no fly' situation exists in this region already, as emphasised by the real-time aircraft flight tracking information map below, taken in the afternoon of 16-Aug-2024.

Some airlines have already stopped flying over parts of the Middle East

Source: Flightradar24.com.

Oil prices under threat

And, of course, there is always the prospect of oil prices rising dramatically, especially if pumping and storage facilities are destroyed and supply lines are disrupted.

There are concerns about rising oil prices in the event of further Israeli retaliation against Iran, the rationale being that "any attack on oil production or export facilities in Iran would drive the price of Brent crude oil to USD100, and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz would lead to prices in the USD120 to USD130 range. The price on16-Aug-2024 was USD78.

Although it can only be hoped that there will be a ceasefire arrangement in Gaza that is acceptable to both sides and hence lasts, that would not end the conflict while Israel's much better armed and better trained foe Hezbollah operates out of Lebanon.

All-out conflict could deliver a fatal blow to the entire region

This is not so much about now as about the future.

Most airports see service reductions at one time or another for a whole variety of reasons, and can cope with them in the short to medium term.

But a full-blown war that drags in Israel, Lebanon and Iran, and hence involves the United States and other countries, as well as sending oil prices through the roof and negatively affecting travel propensity everywhere, is a different matter altogether.

It is one that might deliver a fatal blow to the entire Middle East's prospects as a global aviation hub.