Cathay Pacific has reported a 1H2017 loss and faces its first ever consecutive annual loss. Chairman John Slosar sees this period as a difficult, but necessary, transition to a stronger future, remarking: "We are on the right track".

Unfortunately, Mr Slosar's late board meeting on 16-Aug-2017 postponed results by 4.5 hours. This implied late concerns, creating uncertainty for the public and Cathay's people at a time when management needs to instil confidence that the unpleasant parts of its restructuring are over, and forthcoming change is a progression for the better, and for all.

Distractions multiply as the market proposes strategic detours – LCCs, Air China JV, Air China ownership, new management – bringing solutions that won't work for problems that don't significantly exist. There should be more public breathing room now that the worst appears over. But the big question remains of how much better it will get. 2H2017 should be stronger as passenger yields gain traction, adding to a surprising rebound in cargo.

There is an internal countdown to 2019, when Cathay's fuel hedging losses subside. Looking past the great challenge of hedging losses is evidence Mr Slosar has some cause to be optimistic, but the hard yards are to come.

The A380 is almost synonymous with Emirates, which operates 96 A380s – 45% of the global A380 fleet. Emirates has a further 46 on order while ANA, Qatar and SIA have 10; other outstanding orders may not be realised. Less well remembered is that, as important as Emirates is to the A380, the superjumbo is intertwined with Emirates. Most airlines use their small A380 fleet as a showpiece flying a handful of flights.

For Emirates the A380 is a workhorse, reaching 47 airports with 172 daily flights. Since Airbus is unlikely to proceed with an A380neo update, Emirates faces the difficult question of how to restructure its production model with inevitably smaller aircraft: endure capacity cuts or grow frequencies.

With the 747-8 also fading, the next largest aircraft is the 777-9, of which Emirates has ordered 115. Replacing an A380 with a 777-9 one for one could mean a 25% capacity cut.

If Emirates wanted to maintain capacity on London Heathrow, for example, it would have to replace six A380s with eight 777-9s. Even if the cost of additional flights were accepted and manpower were found, slots (e.g. London Heathrow), hub congestion (Dubai) and traffic rights (Sydney) may stymie frequency growth.