Airline e-commerce

At a growing number of carriers, leaders are taking decisions through e-commerce strategies on how to promote and structure their presence in cyberspace. These decisions have significant impacts.

This report outlines one method of tracking effectiveness, "The Digital Airline Score (DAS)"; it also includes an assessment of 35 airlines from varying geographies and market positions, applying this measure. One conclusion: there is much to be done!

Airlines that have achieved an advanced e-commerce stage realise important benefits. They include improved economic performance and stronger brand attraction. This is the result of two aspects:

• The focus on a "direct-to-consumer" approach. It offers the best value only directly, it drives loyalty and it supports new pricing & revenue models. It also means that the consumer comes to the airline first;

• The taking of control of their destiny by re-engineering business processes related to sales, marketing, and customer service and having transactions done cost-efficiently, electronically and simply.

Airlines in an advanced e-commerce stage are best suited to manage the next frontiers in cyberspace. One of these frontiers is the personalisation of online offerings to individual travellers. Airlines in less developed e-commerce stages are going to fall proportionally behind their leading rivals.

An airline's level of development in e-commerce is often associated with how much revenue it generates online. The higher a carrier's online revenue as a share of total revenue, the arguably more advanced the company is in its e-commerce capabilities. However, this outcome-based focus is quantity driven and says very little about the quality that a carrier applies to e-commerce.

A case in point is LCC Ryanair. The airline produces somewhere between 95% and 98% of its annual revenue via ryanair.com, one of the highest online revenue shares of any carrier in the world. Does this make Ryanair the most advanced airline in cyberspace? When taking into account, for example, that prior to the airline's website redesign in 2013, it took an online booker on average 17 mouse clicks to purchase a ticket on the carrier's website (the standard for efficient website navigation is about five clicks), the answer has to be no. Similarly, until summer 2015, Ryanair did not have a presence on Facebook or feature a mobile website.

The carrier undoubtedly has a justification for this late-mover approach; after all it is among the most profitable airlines in the world. However, it can be argued that other airlines - take 95-year old KLM as an example - offering a wide range of these types of web products for several years now and providing better online experiences to travellers, are actually more advanced in cyberspace even though they produce less revenue online.

Travellers today look far beyond the basic task of being able to buy a ticket online and getting low prices. They seek out those airline digital brands that offer superior quality, trust, service, and innovation. An airline's performance in these areas largely determines its digital competitiveness and ultimately its success in the online marketplace.

Two key factors determine how advanced an airline is in cyberspace: Adoption and use of e-commerce. Examples of these factors include user friendly digital properties - websites that are fast, intuitive and click-efficient in site navigation, rich in features, and also optimised for mobile commerce. Other examples include superior digital data privacy practices, a wide range of digital media use for online advertising and promotion, competitive e-sales and distribution policies, and top-quality web customer service via superior self-/assisted service tools and quick responsiveness to customer queries. A carrier aiming at success in cyberspace needs to manage these multiple factors - not only well, but also concurrently.

Moving to an advanced e-commerce stage does not happen by accident. Senior airline managers have a crucial stake in this process. In their approach, they need to shift their attention to airline e-commerce adoption and use. Specifically, this means de-emphasising single popular metrics such as an airline's online revenue share. Instead, they should focus on capturing and systematically tracking the company's e-commerce activities in a wide range of areas. This approach implies that e-commerce is a prioritised topic on an airline's corporate strategy agenda and that it is recognised as a key driver in the company's future.

Measuring the state of airline e-commerce: The digital airline score (DAS). An airline's adoption and use of e-commerce can be measured across seven attributes. Four of these attributes are fundamental, or the essential minimum, for operating an airline digital brand.

They include digital performance, digital presence, digital brand appearance & protection, and digital data privacy. Furthermore, three attributes are differentiators that airlines usually apply in their e-commerce value chain to distinguish themselves from competitors. These attributes are online advertising & promotion, e-sales & distribution, and web customer service (see chart below).

The impact of these attributes can be measured through proxy indicators (see table below) that apply a rating scale. For each proxy indicator of the four fundamental attributes, the scale ranges from 1 (Poor) and 2 (Fair) to 3 (Good), and 4 (Excellent). For each proxy indicator of the three differentiator attributes, the scale is doubled (2 = Poor, 4 = Fair, 6 = Good, 8 = Excellent) in recognition of their relatively higher importance.

The proxy indicators and the rating scale allow to determine a score called digital airline score (DAS). The total maximum score a carrier could earn is a DAS of 160 (64 for the fundamental attributes + 96 for the differentiator attributes) while the total minimum is a DAS of 40 (16 for the fundamental attributes + 24 for the differentiator attributes).

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The DAS is a useful tool for several reasons:

• It allows a better understanding of an airline's level of e-commerce adoption and use relative to rivals;

• It provides for enhanced insight into the extent of improvement required by an airline to move to an advanced e-commerce stage; and

• It can be used for a change readiness assessment that evaluates a carrier's ability to adopt and implement an e-commerce breakout strategy.

One important aspect needs to be highlighted. A carrier's "digitalness" does not exist in a vacuum and is not the only aspect that drives a traveller to engage online with an airline. Key is also a traveller's brand affinity to a carrier because of the company's reputation. This recognises the fact that an individual's overall impression of, and experience with, an airline exerts some influence. If for instance an airline is held in low esteem by a customer because of past poor service or because of the company's poor reputation in the market place, it might not matter if an airline otherwise excels in e-commerce. The reverse can apply; because of an airline's overall high brand quality, a traveller might overlook some weaknesses in the carrier's cyberspace presence and still engage online with the company's digital properties.

The level of airline e-commerce advancement: An initial assessment, applying DAS

During the spring of 2015, a sample of 35 carriers from different geographies and with different business models was used to score their DAS. In assessing the level of e-commerce advancement for these carriers, four distinct groups emerged (see below):

(i) The constrained e-commerce carrier (DAS: 40 - 79)

Airlines in this category have not begun to engage with e-commerce on a larger scale. Adoption and use are limited and below par. Lack of customer readiness may be one of the external reasons although several internal aspects including lack of overall corporate vision for e-commerce, small talent base, and insufficient resources often play a role as well. Carriers included in this group are TAME of Ecuador, TAAG Angola, Air Greenland, and Philippine Airlines (PAL). Except for their digital performance in terms of website speed and website up-time availability, these four airlines otherwise only earned low scores for both the fundamental and differentiator e-commerce attributes. TAME achieved the lowest score with a DAS of 66 while PAL finishes towards the higher end with a DAS of 73.

(ii) The emerging e-commerce carrier (DAS: 80 - 99)

These airlines have made significant progress in adopting e-commerce. However, its adoption and use are still sub-optimal due to number of internal factors. They may include insufficient resources, limited senior management support, and weak governance/organisational structures. Air India is at the low end of this range with a DAS of 82 while All Nippon Airways (ANA) is the highest performer in this group with a score of 99.

(iii) The transitional e-commerce carrier (DAS: 100 - 119)

Transitional e-commerce carriers have a solid and experienced handle on e-commerce. Its adoption and use are above average competitively and constantly expanding. E-commerce plays a significant role in all aspects of these airlines' business. A cross-over to an advanced level in the near future is likely for the top performers including United Airlines, British Airways, Air New Zealand, Emirates, Singapore Airlines and Qantas.

(iv) The advanced e-commerce carrier (DAS: 120 - 160)

Airlines in this group are most mature in their digitalness. They are in the forefront of deploying new digital applications and related managerial practices. They are also highly sophisticated in the use of e-commerce. Their talent base is strong and e-commerce is a key priority for corporate strategy. Advanced e-commerce carriers are most prepared to embark on a breakout strategy. For example, the implementation of personalisation is a next logical step in these carriers' e-commerce activities.

A total of five airlines in the sample are in an advanced stage of e-commerce. Contrary to popular perception that e-commerce is mostly a domain of LCCs, this group includes several legacy airlines. American Airlines actually achieved the highest score with 125 followed by Delta Air Lines with 122. easyJet and JetBlue are in a tie next with 121 while KLM earned a score of 120. The score range among these carriers is narrow and each of them could own the top spot depending on what they do next.

Improving the level of e-commerce use and adoption. Airlines seeking to advance their e-commerce adoption and use need to have a good understanding of where their digital strengths and weaknesses are. In terms of DAS, this means taking a closer look at the company's performance in the fundamental and differentiator areas of e-commerce.

The chart on the previous page provides for insight of how the sampled carriers scored in this regard. It is evident that there is room for improvement for all carriers. The question is what needs to be done and how it should be done. Depending on how advanced a carrier is in e-commerce, decision makers at airlines should focus on a few key imperatives.

Elevation of e-commerce on the corporate agenda is first and foremost an action item for carriers that are e-commerce constrained. They have significant deficiencies across all relevant areas and the development of an overall framework for e-commerce is essential. In our sample, affected carriers include TAME of Ecuador, TAAG Angola, Air Greenland, and PAL. For the fundamental e-commerce factors, they scored a low DAS between 23 and 28 (the maximum is 64). In terms of differentiator factors, they ranged between 39 and 45 (the maximum of 96). In order to become more effective e-commerce players, each of them has to elevate e-commerce on the corporate agenda. Importantly, the involvement and the oversight at the senior management level is critical. If leaders at these airlines do not take ownership of e-commerce, it will continue being managed as a by-product with non-aligned stakeholders who pursue their own e-commerce agenda for the company. Leaders at these airlines have to view e-commerce as an opportunity that creates benefits for both the company and customers alike.

There are several immediate action items that constrained e-commerce carriers must tackle. Besides providing additional funds and recruiting e-commerce know-how, an improvement of the current web presence is important. This specifically means overhauling the current website design, repurposing existing website content, and introducing industry standard website features. Furthermore, a mobile platform is a "must-have" in today's market place but is typically either missing or sub-standard with carriers in this category.

Launching/upgrading this area would be desirable as soon as possible. Changes like these are instantly visible to customers, who will have a better online experience when using the carrier's digital properties. Only when a carrier has successfully addressed these fundamental issues should an orientation towards the differentiator factors in sales, marketing and customer service be considered.

Introducing better governance and organisational structures. A sub-optimal e-commerce performance is often a reflection of poor organisational processes and structures. This is particularly an issue at emerging e-commerce carriers. As a result, a number of crucial e-commerce factors that should receive utmost attention are improperly managed, possibly neglected, or do not even register on the corporate e-commerce agenda. For example, carriers that have progressed in e-commerce but otherwise do not regularly monitor their website speed or account for the internet access device type online bookers use, do not handle the basics of today's e-commerce requirement effectively. The same can be said for an airline that does not offer a localised website presence in different markets or up-to-date booking engine features.

In the fundamental e-commerce category, Air India earned one of the lowest scores with a DAS of 36. One of the reasons is its slow website. Based on different tests conducted, it took almost 12 seconds to complete page loading, although EgyptAir with 16 seconds and Fiji Airways with 18 seconds were the poorest performers in the entire sample. The benchmark for superior performance is less than four seconds for desktops and less than two seconds for mobile devices.

Other reasons include a non-optimised website design for smart-phones and tablets and the carrier's highly fragmented e-commerce presence in markets outside India. For example, on airindia.com, a link to only two websites outside India is featured (USA and UK) although the carrier operates flights to many countries. At the same time, Air India managers in some countries such as Germany and Italy have launched local website versions that are differently branded and apparently have no connection to the airline's official website.

In the differentiator e-commerce category, Saudia achieved one of the lowest scores with a DAS of 44, due to its weak performance in online promotion & advertising and e-sales & distribution, and web customer service. Among the specific reasons leading to the carrier's low score:

• Except for the company's website in Saudi Arabia, all other 21 country websites do not promote a single fare special. A dedicated fare special page shown on each website is either blank or not accessible;

• The carrier on average does only two posts per week on Facebook (the ideal range is five to 10, JetBlue manages 14 as the leader);

• There appears to be only limited, if any, sponsored search engine marketing for key search terms. For example generic searches including "Flight to Jeddah" and "Fares to Riyadh" return Emirates, Etihad, and Lufthansa on Google's first result page (over 90% of Google search traffic comes from page one - if a brand is not visible there, it does not exist for a web user).

Furthermore, other key reasons why Saudia and carriers including Aeromexico, EgyptAir, and Kenya Airways earned low scores in online promotion & advertising and e-sales & distribution, and web customer service are:

• The airlines do not apply programmatic display advertising. This form of advertising is more efficient than traditional online advertising because it is less expensive and more targeted to an individual user. Advanced e-commerce carriers apply it on a larger scale;

• There is no direct participation with major meta-search engines such as Kayak;

• The carriers' digital brands are poorly protected due to a lack of relevant domain name registrations - for example country specific domains, internationalised domains where the airline brand is featured in language-specific script such as Chinese, and corporate hate domains (usually operated by a consumer with a complaint or a disgruntled ex-employee). Furthermore, the websites' legal notice/terms of use sections are often inadequate in terms of spelling out intellectual property rights and protecting the airline brand against digital content inaccuracies;

• There are no or only very limited online cross-sell/up-sell ancillary products offered; and

• Twitter and email queries are not returned at all or with severe delays by the carriers' customer relations/customer service department.

For carriers from the emerging e-commerce group to close the gap on these essential weaknesses will need to organise e-commerce better. The assessment and implementation involved in this process takes time (six to 12 months). Effective collaboration among stakeholders at the airline and outside companies and efficient decision-making processes are examples of what needs to be achieved. Furthermore, recruitment of e-commerce talent, clear organisational roles and responsibilities, and senior level leadership are also important.

Advanced e-commerce airlines such as KLM and JetBlue and the top performers in transitional e-commerce including Air New Zealand have all of this in place, otherwise their ability to deliver quality offerings in cyberspace would not be as high as it currently is.

Adopting an ecosystem perspective on e-commerce is vital to success in cyberspace; this requires an airline to engage in multiple e-commerce areas and at the same time - only feasible if a carrier acknowledges the convergence among and between fundamental and differentiator e-commerce factors.

For example, advanced e-commerce airlines do not view mobile platforms in isolation from desktops or wearables. There is no discernible disconnect between the "e" and "commerce". IT, e-marketing, e-sales & distribution, and web customer service are viewed as part of the same equation. Advanced e-commerce carriers manage the different "e" and "commerce" components so that they complement and reinforce in each other. They also ask "how can we do this online?" and "what is the impact on other components and stakeholders?" Travellers benefit from this holistic approach in the form of better e-commerce products and a more integrated and consistent online experience.

Less advanced e-commerce carriers often struggle with transcending silos and approaching e-commerce as a coherent ecosystem. This is particularly the case when dealing with the differentiator factors applicable to e-sales & distribution, online advertising & promotion, and web customer service. They are arguably more challenging to manage than fundamental e-commerce aspects such as a website's speed and uptime reliability.

Copa Airlines, Aeromexico and Hawaiian are examples of this situation and to a lesser extent also airberlin and Kenya Airways. These carriers perform relatively well in the fundamental e-commerce category. However, their performance in the differentiator category could improve. Here, the airlines' scores are comparatively lower which indicates performance gaps especially in the online advertising & promotion as well as the e-sales & advertising areas.

Common issues are:

(i) Lack of optimisation in marketing communication for mobile devices.

For instance, when using a smart phone, links from the airlines' sponsored search engine key words, email newsletters, and Facebook postings generally direct a website user to the airline's desktop site as opposed to a mobile site. In today's e-commerce environment where mobile is so widespread, a mobile user should be presented with a correspondingly optimised page. Leading e-commerce carriers recognise this issue and configure all their marketing communication with travellers accordingly.

(ii) Limited ancillary activities

Advanced companies offer ancillaries and produce substantial incremental revenue streams from them. Examples for 2014 are easyJet with 19%, JetBlue (12%), American (8%), Delta (7%), and KLM (6%). In comparison, Copa and Aeromexico generated an estimated 3% while airberlin and Kenya Airways produced 0.7% and 0%, respectively. Managing ancillaries is not an easy task. It requires a higher level of e-commerce know-how and a coordination of stakeholders from multiple departments and outside third parties.

(iii) Some inconsistency in online pricing

The good news is that all airlines in the sample appeared to recognise their website's lower cost of sale in comparison with that of their call centres. Accordingly, fares offered on the carriers' websites are consistently lower and offline bookers are subject to a surcharge. This policy certainly helps increase the "stickiness" of airline websites and migrate bookers from an airline's offline channels.

The situation is different for some airlines when it comes to fare products distributed via online travel agencies (OTAs). Here, the lowest fares were available on OTA websites like Expedia. The difference to a carrier's website fare ranged from small to, sometimes, large. OTAs are valuable to airlines not only because of their role as online sales partners with a large market presence but also because they drive significant traffic to airline websites (the quasi-search engine functions of OTAs).

However, even though there can be strategic reasons for doing so, an airline needs to exercise care in offering consistently lower fares via third party channels as this undermines efforts to capture more customers (and their data) directly.

Stimulating e-commerce demand. Web users can be encouraged to do more business online provided airlines manage their e-commerce adoption and use well. Airlines doing so are more likely to attract web users and generate demand for their online offerings. The top performers with American, Delta, easyJet, JetBlue, and KLM have learned to raise online demand and do an exceptional job in this area. However, despite their superior performance, there are some areas where even these carriers were sub-optimal.

These areas include digital data privacy, web customer service, and website accessibility. Across all airlines of the sample, these are the categories with the lowest scores.

Digital data privacy: All carriers' website privacy policies were thoroughly examined against the so-called FIPs (Fair Information Practices). These are internationally recognised practices that address the privacy of information about individuals. Within the context of FIPs, airlines' data privacy practices were assessed based on the privacy policies posted on their websites. In addition, also captured was the responsiveness of airlines to a data privacy query sent via email. The maximum score for this fundamental e-commerce category is a DAS of 16.

One aspect of the FIPs deals with the timeliness of privacy policies. Considering the numerous changes occurring in the data privacy field, it is of some concern that the majority of carriers do not display a timestamp when their website privacy policies were drawn up or last amended. The perception a data privacy minded traveller may have from this lack of information is that the airline is not necessarily on top of this subject - or worse - that it might change its privacy policy at any time without notification. Air New Zealand is pro-active in this area and a good example that could be followed by more carriers. The airline not only has a privacy policy section titled "Changes to This Privacy Policy" but it also clearly states that it would specify the dates of any updates.

As far as the FIP area of data management transparency is concerned, no airline in the sample performed well. The language used in the website privacy policies is often convoluted, if not too legalese, and difficult to understand for an average reader. Furthermore, while information on data collection sources and purposes are relatively clear with many airlines (American Airlines is good example), meaningful insight in data storage locations is very limited. Most carriers share no information at all or vaguely refer to "other countries". JetBlue was the only carrier explicitly stating that any data collected would be processed and stored in the US. The picture is similar for information on data retention periods. Where an airline even mentioned this issue, it often stated that data would be kept "as long as necessary".

The other area of FIPs examined for all carriers dealt with traveller control of their data. On a positive note, most carriers grant access to the data they hold so that travellers could review and/or correct them. The few exceptions to this policy included EgyptAir, Fiji Airways, Saudia, and South African Airways. Noteworthy is that some airlines actually levy a fee for this service. LCCs like Ryanair can be "excused" for this in light of their business model to monetise services offered. However, it was some surprise to see that other airlines like Emirates and Etihad were among them. If there was a choice between no access and access for a fee, certainly the latter is preferable. Nevertheless, a fee-based approach suggests an anti-consumer policy in terms of data privacy management.

Data sharing by airlines with third parties is a common practice. It is generally done for the fulfilment of online commercial services and for law enforcement/national security reasons. However, travellers often have little if any idea who these third parties are. Both easyJet and JetBlue are exceptions in sharing a concrete list; most carriers simply refer to "external service providers" and "legal authorities". This is not necessarily an approach to build trust with online users.

Airlines allow travellers to indicate if they consent to receiving marketing, sales, and flight operational information either from the airline itself or from its partners. This is an important piece of protection and control over the travellers' data. Many carriers in the sample appear to pursue an opt-out policy whereby travellers receive communication by default. This translates to a lower degree of protection for travellers but still furnishes them with some control. In this instance, travellers have to be pro-active in notifying the carrier to indicate that they do not want to receive certain types of communication.

Opt-in/Opt-out selections are also relevant for travellers in the context of website tracking technologies, particularly cookie applications that are used by airlines. Most airlines apply these and in all instances, the default setting is for "opt-in". This means that a traveller is assumed to agree to being tracked. If a web user prefers not being tracked, it is generally not easy to opt out. Many airlines share no information at all on how to do this while some provide for links to generic third party sites like allaboutcookies.org. Only a small number of airlines including American, Aeromexico, and easyJet feature specific opt-out choices.

The final area assessed for digital data privacy dealt with the responsiveness of carriers to privacy policy queries. With a few exceptions, the responsiveness of airlines to privacy policy queries was poor. In three cases (Air India, Air China, EgyptAir), the email sent to their dedicated privacy contact bounced due to broken links. Ryanair sends customers on a perpetual cycle as their auto-reply directs customers back to the original contact form where the same query has to be filled out again.

A total of eight airlines did not respond at all and this group includes high profile names such as Air Canada, American, JetBlue and Saudia. Others responded with an auto-reply stating that it would take them a few days to return an answer - in Fiji Airways' case, this period would be 21 days - a lifetime in cyberspace while Air France said that their reply would be delayed due to a strike. This is still preferable to what All Nippon Airways does: they request data queries to be sent via traditional mail to their office in Japan - where a customer service fee is payable.

Those who did respond often provided generic information as opposed to answering the specific privacy questions asked. Referring to the airline's privacy policy is a common tactic. In Delta's case, it took two follow-up emails to finally obtain a more concrete reply. easyJet performed relatively well: following up on their initial auto-reply within seven days, they provided detailed information. Gol replied within two days and answered the questions raised.

In summary, for airlines' performance in the area of data privacy, British Airways was the best performer with a DAS of 12, followed by American and Singapore Airlines with 11 each. Air New Zealand, Delta, JetBlue, easyJet, and United each scored 10. All remaining carriers scored below 10. In essence, this is an indication that data privacy practices and related customer service support for customer queries leave much room for improvement in terms of their data management from a web user perspective.

In practice and over and above any legal duties, these issues may seem small; but they do hint at professionalism and a level of sincerity in terms of taking e-commerce seriously.

After digital privacy, web customer service is the second weakest area for all carriers in the sample. The analysis has revealed significant gaps in carriers' capabilities. In essence, this shows what is already a known fact for airlines in the offline world: the delivery of good customer service is not easy but those that excel at it truly differentiate themselves from rivals.

Out of the total possible score of 32 for web customer service, the highest score earned by any carrier was a DAS of 22 by British Airways. Next were Lufthansa and easyJet that scored 20 each. Every other carrier otherwise achieved a score somewhere between eight, the lowest possible score - all four constrained e-commerce carriers fall into this - and 18.

The large majority of airlines offers a less than sufficient range of online service options. Particularly, self-service tools such as FAQ, site search, and edgy options such as virtual assistants were often missing. Interestingly, even when self-service tools are available, most carriers do not appear to take advantage of their relatively lower costs (self-service costs USD0.10 or less per customer contact while phone support ranges between USD6 and USD12). This often shows itself on websites where both self-service and assisted service options are somewhat randomly presented.

Advanced e-commerce carriers on the other hand offer a wide range of different service options. They do this because they know that travellers often bounce back and forth between numerous channels in order to resolve their issue. Also, they know that customers from different age groups have different preferences when it comes to certain service options. Offering a wide range thus allows an airline to fulfil the needs of a larger audience.

At the same time, e-commerce-savvy airlines are also cost conscious when it comes to web customer service. They prioritise low-cost self-service options over higher, customer-assisted, service cost options. For example, instead of featuring a toll-free phone number on the homepage, these carriers encourage web travellers to use self-service options first before escalating to email, chat, or phone. This approach is supported by clever web design and "penalties" in the form of surcharges that are occasionally levied on travellers if they engage a customer service representative.

Another aspect reviewed for scoring web customer service was the degree of integration among the different service options. Customers dislike nothing more than disconnected service channels that not only make the transition between them a challenge but also require them to share their service issue multiple times over. For instance, by the time a web traveller contacts an airline via phone, the customer service representative very likely has no idea that the traveller might have already tried to self-help on the carrier's website or received assistance via social media from other customers.

With the exception of British Airways, no airline in the sample currently applies a solution to carry over content from one service channel to another. Accordingly, each airline only received the lowest score in this area. In the case of British Airways, a digital application is used that "understands" the content of email queries that a traveller has written and is about to send off to the airline.

Before the email query is submitted, however, the web user is offered possible answers from the website's FAQ section. If the user finds one of the suggested answers acceptable to address their problem, sending an email is no longer necessary. An approach like this provides for an improved customer experience and makes better use of corporate resources.

A lack of responsiveness to customer service queries contributed to low ratings in this category. For instance, the quality of social customer care varied significantly. A total of eight carriers did not reply at all (for example Aeromexico, Air Asia, Fiji Airways, and Singapore Airlines). Some airlines took hours (Air China with 14 hours) while others came back in less than 10 minutes (for example JetBlue, KLM and Lufthansa) to reply to a Twitter question.

In the area of email communication, the performance was poor for most airlines. For example, JetBlue and KLM did not reply while easyJet responded within seven days. Lack of communication and lack of consistency in communication across different service channels within a single carrier appears to be a big issue.

Website accessibility for the disabled is becoming a legal necessity as well as a valued customer service. As airlines have moved more services online, equal access for users that suffer from visual, auditory, tactile, and cognitive disabilities has become increasingly important. The number of people affected is not small. According to the UN, an estimated 650 million people in the world live with disabilities. Together with their families, that means approximately two billion people are directly affected by disability, representing almost a third of the world's population. This issue is expected to become even more prominent with ageing societies in key travel markets.

Several airlines have made some modifications to their websites in this regard (Air India, ANA, British Airways, Delta Air Lines, easyJet, and Qantas). For example, Delta has converted its website in recognition of Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act that mandates federal agencies in the US to make their website accessible. British Airways is working with a UK charity organisation called AbilityNet to make ba.com accessible to users with disabilities. Air India, ANA, easyJet, and Qantas are also airlines that offer certain web accessibility features. All other carriers appear to be silent on this subject.

According to the Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C) and its web content accessibility guidelines (WCAG)/level AA, none of the 35 carriers' websites in the sample is fully accessible for users with disabilities. Why is this standard relevant? In Nov-2013, the US Department of Transportation (DoT) announced that the Air Carriers Access Act (ACAA) of 1986 that prohibits discrimination by US and foreign air carriers on the basis of physical or mental disability would apply to websites as well. Accordingly, airlines serving the US market would be required to upgrade their websites to the WCAG/level AA standard in two phases: First, by Dec-2015, all web pages that provide for core travel services and information (for example booking engine, frequent flyer account) must be compliant. Second, by Dec-2016, all remaining web pages that cover non-core travel areas such as the "About us" and the "News" sections must have been adjusted.

If a carrier has not started working on its website upgrade during summer of 2015, it is likely to violate the Dec-2015 deadline. This is because the effort involved is significant and time consuming. The consequences may include financial penalties, temporary website shutdowns, and negative PR. The new website accessibility standards are also likely to reverberate outside the US. Government agencies of the EU and of countries including Australia, Canada, and New Zealand have already adopted the WCAG standard. Therefore it is only a question of time before the WCAG standard will also become a legal-regulatory requirement for online retailers including airlines.

At this stage, the US DoT has refrained from imposing a web accessibility standard on mobile devices and applications and other means of electronic communications such as email and text messaging. This is largely because of the absence of wider accessibility standards for these technologies and the need to focus carriers' resources first on achieving accessibility compliance for their websites. Nevertheless, corresponding guidelines will be introduced soon and airlines need to be ready for this upgrade as well. In other words, web accessibility is about to become an integral part of airline e-commerce.

In summary, if the issues described in these three areas are not addressed and managed more effectively in the near future, they may depress potential online demand by travellers. They certainly present an opportunity for an airline to stand out from others if they perform well.

In conclusion: there is plenty of room for improvement in an underperforming field. The art and science of airline e-commerce is steadily evolving. There are, as always, some standouts at each end of the spectrum and all can learn from their peers.

Yet there is no one way to success in this area, just as there are many different goals that airlines establish (or not) to achieve their wish to achieve through the medium. But it is evident that most carriers are still not well positioned to compete effectively in cyberspace, nor to reap the rewards available.

And, although judgments on airline effectiveness must necessarily be subjective, a tool such as DAS allows an insight to the gaps in an airline's adoption and use of e-commerce.

Companies that fall into the constrained or emerging categories are well advised at least to initiate an analysis of their situation, to look at market best practice, and to determine what is going on and what needs to be done. This is the underpinning for a sound strategy for airline e-commerce.

Even where airlines have scored well with DAS and are categorised as advanced or about to be advanced and are doing a lot of things better than the rest, there can be no room for complacency in this fast moving territory.

Today's empowered consumers are frequently much more proficient - and demanding - in cyberspace than airlines. It is vital for airlines to adopt a mentality that recognises the opportunities - and potential threats - in dealing with consumers in cyberspace. The best e-commerce airline practitioners will always be in catch-up mode as the periods of relative market stability shrink constantly. Thus a true breakout strategy, for example via personalisation, may always remain elusive for even the best of airlines.

Nevertheless, the key is to be best prepared for the transitions ahead. Improving its digitalness is a corporate imperative for any airline, while regularly conducting internal audits to assess its core competencies in the area.

An annual DAS-based approach along the lines set out in this report offers one way to evaluate an airline's position and those of its competitors. As necessary, strategic directions for e-commerce can then be constantly adjusted. No-one will "get it right", but an important start is at least to recognise fully the importance of this activity and to put in place the necessary structures to apply best practice - and even eventually to create it.

This report is a lightly edited version of a report researched and prepared by Dr. Michael Hanke. Michael is founder of SkaiBlu, an airline e-commerce consultancy based in Los Angeles.SkaiBlu advises airlines worldwide on e-commerce strategies. This report is an excerpt from Michael's upcoming book titled "Airline E-commerce: Log on.Take off" . He can be reached at mh@skaiblu.com.