Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport
- CAPA Analysis
- Schedule Analysis
- Route Maps
- Airport Charges
- Fast Fact Report
- IATA Code
- ICAO Code
- Corporate Address
- 3400 E. Sky Harbor Blvd., Suite 3300, Phoenix, AZ 85034, (602) 273-3300
- United States of America
- Other airports serving Phoenix
- Phoenix Deer Valley Airport
Phoenix Goodyear Airport
Phoenix Mesa Gateway Airport
- 3502m x 46m
3139m x 46m
2377m x 46m
- Airlines currently operating to this airport with scheduled services
- Air Canada
Delta Air Lines
Great Lakes Airlines
- Airlines currently operating to this airport via codeshare
- Aer Lingus
Air Europa Lineas Aereas
Air New Zealand
Air Tahiti Nui
All Nippon Airways
China Eastern Airlines
China Southern Airlines
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
LOT Polish Airlines
South African Airways
Virgin Atlantic Airways
Phoenix Sky Harbour International Airport is the major international gateway to Phoenix, Arizona. Phoenix is a demographic and business centre in the United States, and Phoenix Sky Harbour is the busiest airport in Arizona and among the busiest in the country. American Airlines is the largest operator at Phoenix and it is a major hub for the airline.
Location of Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport, United States of America
Ground Handlers and Cargo Handlers servicing Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport
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Fuel & Oil Suppliers servicing Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport
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51 total articles
Canadian ULCC start up NewLeaf Travel is reaching six months of operations and during that time has transported 150,000 passengers under its unique arrangement with Flair Airlines, in which Flair operates aircraft on behalf of NewLeaf.
NewLeaf continues to promote the stimulatory benefits of its model, but its network development has featured many fits and starts, including the recent temporary suspension of some routes due to problems with Flair’s aircraft availability. Before the launch the company also decided to cancel service to Phoenix Mesa airport, due to WestJet’s decision to introduce new flights in direct competition with NewLeaf.
NewLeaf opted to use existing aircraft capacity in order to be a first mover in the ULCC space within Canada, but its recent schedule adjustments indicate that purchasing existing capacity might not be a viable model for the long term. WestJet’s competitive response to NewLeaf also raises questions about whether the ULCC model will ultimately prevail in Canada.
A decision by Alaska Air Group and Delta Air Lines to dissolve their codesharing partnership in late 2016 was not surprising, given that the demise of their relationship began about four years ago when Delta opted to build Seattle into a strategic trans Pacific hub. Since that time the financial benefit Alaska has enjoyed from the relationship has dwindled as Delta has built up its own network in Seattle to feed its long haul flights, rather than rely on passengers from Alaska.
After the two airlines formally announced their split: through the planned launch of seven new markets from the airport in 2017 Delta sent a clear message that it had no intention of backing down in Seattle, breaking an Alaska monopoly in several of those markets. However, Delta’s international expansion from Seattle appears to be on hold until the airport completes a new customs facility at the airport in 2019.
Even as their relationship officially ends, competitive dynamics between Alaska and Delta will intensify on the US west coast as Alaska embarks on its merger integration with Virgin America. Alaska will find itself competing with Delta and numerous other airlines in the strategic and fragmented Los Angeles market, and the merged entity retains a solid presence on numerous key routes from the airport.
Canada’s two largest airlines are embarking on 2017 with a tilt toward international expansion. Air Canada is continuing its march toward building a global competitive network that rivals those of its North American global airline peers, and WestJet is setting the stage to expand a long haul trans-Atlantic network. As has been the case during the past few years, the bulk of Air Canada’s capacity expansion will be directed into international markets in 2017; WestJet is pledging slower system capacity growth after its expansion in 2016, which coupled with unit revenue pressure has created some investor anxiety.
Both airlines are beginning 2017 with higher valuations as Canada’s economic growth should settle towards 2% in 2017. Although the country’s economic growth forecast is not stellar, it is at least stable. Canada’s province of Alberta is climbing out of a recession after the region’s economic weakness had created challenges for Canadian airlines during the last year.
Two aspiring Canadian ULCCs are attempting to launch operations in 2017, joining NewLeaf Travel – which has recently cancelled new routes after encroachment by WestJet. Canada’s first low cost airline has pledged to compete fiercely with the start-ups, and its actions are reinforcing that declaration.
International passenger numbers for the Mexican low cost airline Interjet skyrocketed more than 50% in the first seven months of 2016, reflecting the launch of more than 10 new international routes during that period, and with US transborder routes representing the bulk of Interjet’s international expansion.
Interjet is no doubt positioning itself to seize on opportunities created by a new, finalised bilateral between the US and Mexico that lifts restrictions on the number of airlines operating on specific routes between the two countries. Interjet’s rival Volaris has also grown its US transborder passengers in 2016, but it has a different route profile from that of Interjet. Generally, Interjet is subject to higher levels of competition on some of its transborder routes than Volaris, given that Interjet and Volaris offer different products to their passengers.
During the past two to three years Interjet and Volaris have been essentially tied for the coveted position of Mexico’s second largest domestic airline. But for the seven months ending Jul-2017 Volaris logged 22% domestic passenger growth, while Interjet’s passenger numbers inched down slightly, resulting in Volaris assuming full command of the second place ranking.
The City of Phoenix, Arizona, and its region are typical of the Sun Belt metropolitan areas that lured firms away from what became known as the ‘rust belt’ cities of the northeast and Midwest of the US from the 1970s onwards.
Phoenix’s main airport, Sky Harbor International (PSHIA), while serving a large local population in what is still a fast growing state, has increasingly found itself competing for hub traffic with other such big city-region airports, such as Los Angeles and Las Vegas. While it has excellent domestic and wider North and Latin American connections, it lacks connections to some important international regions.
This CAPA report examines Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport by way of several sets of metrics, looks at the airports that can be considered its rivals, and at its construction activities and ownership.
Top priorities for the new chief executive of Spirit Airlines are improving operations and customer service, areas where the company has lagged far behind its US airline peers during the last couple of years. As US competitive dynamics change, those two factors are becoming distinguishing factors for succeeding in an environment where falling fuel costs are, for the foreseeable future, keeping fares low.
Although Spirit has no plans to match the 30% expansion in capacity that it recorded in 2015, management still believes that a growth rate of 15% to 20% is reasonable. However, it appears that the airline seems poised to make some nuanced changes to its network strategy by focusing less on large markets and evaluating more mid-sized markets. Depending on the changes that occur, the composition of Spirit’s fleet could look different in five years, compared with today.
In the short term, Spirit has not observed further deterioration in the US pricing environment; however, it has not experienced marked improvement either. As a result its unit revenue revenue performance in 1Q2016 will likely mirror the 16% decline the airline posted in 4Q2015.