Osaka Kansai International Airport
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- IATA Code
- ICAO Code
- Corporate Address
- Kansai International Airport Building 1-banchi, Senshu-Kuko Kita, Izumisano-shi, Osaka 549-8501, Japan
- Other airports serving Osaka
- Kobe Airport
Osaka Itami Airport
- 3500m x 61m
4000m x 60m
- Airlines currently operating to this airport with scheduled services
- Air Burundi
Air Hong Kong
Air New Zealand
All Nippon Airways
Cebu Pacific Air
China Eastern Airlines
China Southern Airlines
Delta Air Lines
Global Jet Ltd
Hong Kong Airlines
Hong Kong Express
Japan Transocean Air
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Nippon Cargo Airlines
- Airlines currently operating to this airport via codeshare
- Air Canada
CSA Czech Airlines
South African Airways
Kansai International Airport is one of three airports serving Osaka, handling both domestic and international flights. Owned by Kansai International Airport Co Ltd, it is the main airport in the region for scheduled international passenger routes. It opened in 1994 and is constructed on a man-made island located 40km from the city centre. It is an international hub for JAL and ANA and hosts over 40 airlines.
Location of Osaka Kansai International Airport, Japan
Ground Handlers servicing Osaka Kansai International Airport
834 total articles
51 total articles
Japan may be the land of the rising sun, but for US airlines the country is fading in importance. American Airlines, Delta Air Lines and United Airlines will have fewer seats from the continental US to Japan in 2014 than in 2013. Japan will also comprise a smaller share of their Asian network. American and Delta in 2003 had Japan as their sole Asian destination from the US, but in 2014 Japan will account for only 43% of American's Asia capacity and 66% of Delta's. United's Japan exposure has decreased from 67% in 2003 to 42% in 2014.
The carriers are adding capacity to Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan, but the main beneficiary of their growth is mainland China. American and United in 2014 will have almost as much capacity to China as to Japan. The change comes as American and United settle into joint-ventures with Japanese partners while Delta looks for a partner of its own. Despite China's increase in capacity significance, the market still has to mature from a premium and outbound standpoint. And no doubt China-US JVs will emerge, and one day overtake the Japan-US JVs.
As Delta Air Lines continues a seemingly open attack on its partner Alaska Air Group at its Seattle hub, Alaska Airlines is stressing that alliances like its long-time pact with Delta are complicated. Its overall message is that it will work with Delta where it is mutually beneficial and compete vigorously as Delta continues its encroachment.
Delta’s latest moves are in two of Alaska’s key north-south markets on the US Pacific west coat – Portland and Seattle. Ironically, Delta seems to be practicing what Alaska executives recently stressed to analysts – removing emotion from evolving competitive dynamics. As Delta continues its moves into Alaska’s markets unabated, it certainly is showing no emotion as Seattle continues to rise in prominence in Delta’s domestic and international network.
Just how the current competitive build-up by Delta in Alaska’s markets will affect their long-term relationship is uncertain. But in the meantime Alaska continues to post financial results that are among the best in the US industry, which means that it has a strong foundation from which to defend itself.
Whisper it quietly, but Japan's low-cost carriers appear to be cannibalising traffic at All Nippon Airways and Japan Airlines. ANA and JAL carried 19% fewer passengers between Osaka and Sapporo in 2012 than 2010 despite the overall market growing 20%. This goes against the story all parties tell that LCCs are only increasing, not cannibalising, volumes. The cannibalisation is confined, so far, but there are signs of concern. ANA and JAL saw reduced traffic in 2012 on overlapping LCC routes despite overall 2012 traffic being the strongest in nearly five years.
ANA and JAL are responding differently to LCCs. The nuances reflect their wider outlook – and fears. JAL is more aggressively cutting capacity on overlapping LCC routes while ANA is sometimes growing. In the medium-term, JAL expects to cut overall domestic capacity in line with the country's shrinking nature while ANA plans growth. JAL's cuts have been rewarded with higher load factors while ANA's growth has seen lower load factors, but all load factors need improvement.
The story of low-cost carriers in Japan follows not just the classic script of the youthful carrier taking on legacy incumbents. It also borrows from the Indian and Latin American experience of LCCs providing an alternative to long bus rides. And in a situation unique to Japan, LCCs provide an inexpensive alternative to pricey high-speed trains.
It is this broad context that explains Peach Aviation's entry into the Tokyo-Osaka market, which connects Japan's best-known cities but is not the country's largest domestic air route. Peach and Jetstar Japan will offer 3,780 weekly one-way seats, a drop in the bucket to the over 111,000 offered by airline competitors on this 405km route. But airline incumbents are not the sole target: one-way fares on the shinkansen cost about USD140 while an overnight bus, sometimes without bathrooms, could be USD32-100 depending on availability. So a one-way fare from USD42 on Peach or Jetstar Japan represents a seismic change. Competing with the shinkansen, the LCCs do require a trip out to Narita, but the fare is a third of the price. Competing with buses, the LCCs may be cheaper or about the same but with comfort and a shorter journey time. The story of LCCs in Japan is young and they are still finding traction, but their impacts are indisputable and will steadily grow.
Diagnosing the exact cause of failure at AirAsia Japan, which will end operations with that name on 31-Oct-2013, is subject to opinion of joint venture partners AirAsia Berhad and All Nippon Airways (ANA), as well as third parties. But most would agree that there have been fundamental structural problems.
Many of the challenges have faced not only AirAsia Japan but also Jetstar Japan and Peach Aviation. Some problems were spotted in advance and intentionally avoided by peers. Collectively, they point towards LCCs having a long-term future in Japan but only under the right circumstances.
AirAsia Japan’s troubles stem from its ownership structure that gives ANA majority control; something that a Japanese carrier does not have in Jetstar Japan or Peach. This allows LCC professionals, not legacy managers, to run the airline.
Hawaiian Airlines is still awaiting the rewards of network diversification it undertook a few years ago with the launch of several new Asian routes along with flights to Auckland and Brisbane. The effort was designed to offset Hawaiian’s dependence on service to the US mainland, which has become increasingly competitive during the last few years.
The rapid-fire route introductions have been plagued by currency weakness in Japan, retaliatory competitive capacity additions and Hawaiian’s spooling up in understanding the distinctive nuances of each market. At the same time overcapacity in its North American markets – which still comprise the majority of its revenues – continues to pressure Hawaiian’s performance.
As those challenges continue to cast a spectre on Hawaiian’s performance, the carrier has reversed its fortunes within its inter-island network, which weakened during 2012 when Hawaiian made a push from Maui and overestimated the capacity it needed to build a hub in Kahului.
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