London Gatwick Airport
- CAPA Analysis
- Schedule Analysis
- Cargo Analysis
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- IATA Code
- ICAO Code
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- Gatwick Airport
West Sussex, RH6 0NP,
- United Kingdom
- Domestic | International
- Airport Type
- Other airports serving London
- London City Airport
London Heathrow Airport
London Luton Airport
London Stansted Airport
- 3316m x 46m
2565m x 45m
3159m x 45m
- Airlines currently operating to this airport with scheduled services
- Adria Airways
Air Arabia Maroc
Air Europa Lineas Aereas
Aurigny Air Services
Heli Air Monaco
Norwegian Air Shuttle
Royal Air Maroc
Thomas Cook Airlines
Ukraine International Airlines
Virgin Atlantic Airways
- Airlines currently operating to this airport via codeshare
Delta Air Lines
Formerly owned by BAA, London Gatwick Airport is operated by Gatwick Airport Ltd. Gatwick is wholly-owned by Ivy Bidco Limited (Ivy), a company formed to undertake the acquisition of Gatwick. Ivy is ultimately controlled by funds managed by Global Infrastructure Management, LLC, part of Global Infrastructure Partners (GIP). GIP, a USD5.6 billion independent investment fund, invests worldwide in infrastructure assets. It targets investments in air transport infrastructure, ports, freight rail, power and utilities, natural resources infrastructure, water distribution and treatment, and waste management.
London Gatwick is the second busiest airport in the United Kingdom. Hosting regional and international passenger and cargo services for over 30 airlines, London Gatwick is a hub for airlines including Aer Lingus, British Airways, easyJet, Flybe, Monarch Airlines, Thomas Cook Airlines, Thomson Airways and Virgin Atlantic Airways. London Gatwick is the busiest single-runway airport in the world.
Location of London Gatwick Airport, United Kingdom
Ground Handlers and Cargo Handlers servicing London Gatwick Airport
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Garuda Indonesia will slow its international growth following a lacklustre performance on international routes in 1H2014, which drove a net loss of USD212 million. Garuda recorded an average international load factor of only 63% in 1H2014 as RPKs dropped by 3% despite a 15% surge in ASKs.
Competition in the Indonesian international and broader Southeast Asian market has intensified, making life extremely tough for Garuda just as the carrier attempts to make a bigger international push following its ascension into SkyTeam. The introduction of five 777-300ERs over the last year has contributed to overcapacity, just as its long-haul strategy has had to be revised.
Garuda has responded to the unfavourable market conditions by deferring plans to launch services to India and the Philippines. The carrier is also now planning to cut unprofitable routes and reduce capacity growth by deferring aircraft deliveries.
easyJet's reported revenue growth of 8.6% for 3QFY2014 (i.e. Apr-2014 to Jun-2014), is an acceleration on 1H's 6.3%, with further growth in revenue per seat. However, load factors are already at industry-leading levels throughout the year and easyJet will probably need to focus more on revenue per passenger if it is to continue to see continued growth in revenue per seat. In 3Q, it experienced a rare (and slight) dip in revenue per passenger. To some extent, the change in the timing of Easter distorts year on year comparison for 3Q, but the airline's new FY2014 guidance implies a modest fall in revenue per seat in 4Q.
Strong capacity growth by easyJet at Gatwick, due to the acquisition of slots from Flybe, and a competitive environment of increasing capacity growth are making themselves felt in this modest yield weakness.
Nevertheless, easyJet's unit costs were lower than previously expected and it has a significant cost advantage versus legacy carriers at the primary airports on which its network focuses. Moreover, its FY2014 guidance implies another year of double digit profit growth and return on capital above the cost of capital.
This is the second part of CAPA's report on the recent ‘Aerotropolis EMEA’ Conference.
It contains comments from a range of panellists including Munich Airport, Gatwick Airport, Stockholm Airport, London Heathrow, the City Council of El Prat, the City of Amsterdam, Schiphol Real Estate, Durban's Dube Tradeport, Copenhagen Airports, Edmonton Airport, Denver Airport and others, under the guidance of Professor Kasarda.
Professor Kasarda's conclusion was that there are four themes critical for success for an aerotropolis:
- Stakeholder alignment and community buy-in to the project;
- Appropriate business model needed;
- Connectivity in the air and on the ground and;
- The Aerotropolis is a process/strategy, not a project!
The Aerotropolis is a process or strategy, not a project. That was the main conclusion of a conference, ‘Aerotropolis EMEA’, which took place in Manchester, UK, in early Jul-2014.
Attempts were made to define the Aerotropolis and to differentiate it from the ‘Airport City’ to delegates that ranged in nature from the already well-informed to the absolute beginner. It was interesting to note that several major airports do not use the terms ‘airport city’ or ‘aerotropolis’ even though it is widely observed that they have one or the other, or both, themselves.
Moreover, the US FAA does not have a definition of Airport City or Aerotropolis, despite the fact that some of the best examples, and particularly the area around Dallas-Fort Worth airport, can be found in the US. Clearly, these concepts are a process that is still a work-in-progress.
In Dec-2013 the UK’s Airports (Davies) Commission identified in an Interim Report three possible options for enhanced airport capacity in the UK; all of them in the southeast of England. Two were at London's Heathrow and one at Gatwick.
At the same time, and seemingly under some political pressure, the Commission agreed to allot extra time to a more detailed analysis of several proposals for a new airport on the banks of, or in, the River Thames Estuary.
After a period of reflection on everyone’s part the gloves are back on as the main protagonists square up once again with a series of revised proposals. But in the end, politics, not logic is likely to be the deciding factor.
The airline business is a seasonal one and European airlines tend to lose money in the winter. EasyJet is no exception in this respect, but it has again narrowed its winter loss in 1HFY2014. With targeted capacity growth, it increased its revenue per seat faster than cost per seat.
Revenue per seat was also helped by a growing number of passengers flying for business purposes. On a rolling 12 month basis, easyJet said that it carried 12 million business travellers in the year to Mar-2014, around 20% of total passenger numbers. Since it started to target business passengers in 2010, the number has grown by 44%, demonstrating what can be achieved without having a business class cabin.
Competitor capacity growth is accelerating this summer and easyJet will see its own growth accelerated by the inclusion of Gatwick slots acquired from Flybe. This may lead to some downward pressure on yields, although the strength of its network and product features such as allocated seating may mitigate this. Certainly, narrower winter losses place it well for another year of healthy growth in profit.