Dubai International Airport
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- Cargo Analysis
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- IATA Code
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- United Arab Emirates
- Domestic | International
- Airport Type
- Other airports serving Dubai
- Dubai Creek Airport
Dubai Jebel Ali SPB Airport
Dubai World Central (Al Maktoum Airport)
- 4000m x 60m
4000m x 46m
- Airlines currently operating to this airport with scheduled services
Air India Express
Ariana Afghan Airlines
ASL Airlines Belgium
Azerbaijan Airlines AZAL
Biman Bangladesh Airlines
China Eastern Airlines
China Southern Airlines
ECAir - Equatorial Congo Airlines
Global Aviation and Services Group
Iran Aseman Airlines
Iranian Naft Airlines
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Middle East Airlines
Norwegian Air International
Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA
Pakistan International Airlines
Rossiya - Russian Airlines
Royal Brunei Airlines
Shaheen Air International
Ukraine International Airlines
Virgin Atlantic Airways
- Airlines currently operating to this airport via codeshare
- Aer Lingus
Air New Zealand
All Nippon Airways
CSA Czech Airlines
Delta Air Lines
South African Airways
Dubai International Airport is one of largest airports in the Middle East, among the largest airports in the world and a key cargo hub in the region. The airport has seen phenomenal growth in the past decade, which has come with the expansion of home carrier, Emirates. Dubai International is located in a built-up urban area, and to cater for expected growth the facility will be complemented by the larger, but more distant, Al Maktoum International Airport. Although the vast majority of growth has come from Emirates, the airport has benefited from increasing service from carriers around the world as Dubai has gained prominence as a tourist destination and business centre.
Location of Dubai International Airport, United Arab Emirates
Ground Handlers and Cargo Handlers servicing Dubai International Airport
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Fuel & Oil Suppliers servicing Dubai International Airport
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4,024 total articles
188 total articles
As airlines worry about having passed their peaks and entering a downturn, flydubai, the LCC owned by the Dubai government, is on an upwards trajectory. This is very welcome after flydubai's sudden and sharp 1H2015 loss occurred as most other airlines were in party mode, buoyed by low fuel prices. flydubai significantly narrowed its 1H2016 loss despite double-digit growth. With the industry worrying about its health, flydubai appears to have caught the cold early and rebounded from it. An improvement in load factor, uplift in business traffic (19%) and reduction in expenses may show greater efficiency that can be maintained – the silver lining to the financial upset.
flydubai's 1H2016 loss narrowed to USD24.5 million from 1H2015's USD40 million, despite a 14.9% increase in flights. Losses per passenger decreased about nine percentage points faster. Unlike its bigger sister Emirates, also owned by the Dubai government but run separately, flydubai is primarily a point-to-point operator - so it depends on the health of Dubai.
Qantas on 24-Aug-2016 delivered its second consecutive AUD1 billion annual profit, indicating that the long restructuring under the tenure of CEO Alan Joyce has not only worked but created a stronger Qantas. The group has weathered the boom and bust of the Australian resource economy and times with Asian LCC JVs; has turned Gulf and Chinese competitors into partners; and has risen above a key competitor's influx of foreign shareholding, which fuelled an unsustainable capacity and product war.
The question for Qantas is what next. Domestic has returned to a comfortable duopoly and growth is on the wane, while international partners will contribute higher growth by putting passengers onto the domestic Qantas network. Loyalty, a stable business, is growing and profitable but does not capture Mr Joyce's passion. Internationally, North America is Qantas' anchor. The continent accounts for one third of Qantas' now profitable international capacity. Qantas and its proposed partner American Airlines dominate, holding 42% of the Australia/New Zealand-North America market. It is a profitable but not very emotional business, although it could move to new 787-9 routes to Dallas or Chicago. Where Qantas remains strategically keen is to Asia and Europe, where its historical deficiency helped rivals Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific to rise to their powerhouse status.
The competition with SIA and Cathay is longstanding but reinvigorated: SIA has reiterated its desire to operate between Australia and the US, while Qantas blames Cathay for squashing the proposed LCC Jetstar Hong Kong. Qantas may not be able to beat SIA and Cathay entirely, but for the first time in its history Qantas believes it can compete with them on cost. Qantas seeks mainline and Jetstar growth to and within Asia. Qantas is weighing a European restructuring that could result in the launch of 787-9 flights between Perth and London – the first nonstop flight between Australia and Europe. Qantas may not be as big as it used to be, but it is smarter, more agile and more profitable. Qantas has evolved, but its competitors appear less stable. This is a time to seize momentum and rebuild Qantas' flagship status.
At the turn of the century it would have been heresy to describe Southwest Airlines as embattled. The venerable low cost airline was a perennial passenger favourite, and its employee relations were the most positive and successful among US airlines. But during recent years the company’s admirable relationship with labour has soured, culminating in the recent declaration by Southwest’s union leaders that the company’s top two executives should vacate their positions.
The labour discontent and years-long negotiations have not only damaged management’s credibility in the eyes of many employees, but have also prevented Southwest from taking important steps to create more outlets to generate revenue – including establishing potentially valuable codesharing relationships. As Southwest moves closer toward having the proper technology to support those partnerships, the likelihood that labour groups will approve codeshares is decidedly low as rifts between management and employees deepen.
Southwest had reached an inflection point in its frayed labour relations. Its golden image has tarnished, and the longer that contract talks drag on, the more that scrutiny over management’s ability to mend the strained relationships will continue to intensify.
The Middle East's three big network airlines – Emirates, Etihad and Qatar Airways – are following different growth paths in 2016. Emirates is largely holding course, continuing recent 10% p/a ASK growth. Qatar Airways is accelerating growth and so far for 2016 will add as many ASKs as Emirates will – the first year it will do so.
After growing around 20% p/a for most of its short history, Etihad is decelerating with 10% growth although its net ASK additions will be similar to levels in 2012 and 2013. Etihad wants to bed down growth, replace partner aircraft it has been using, and improve equity partner financials amidst the Abu Dhabi government reducing spending, as observed elsewhere in the Middle East following the sharp decrease in oil price. Etihad's size in 2016 is about where Emirates was in mid-2007 while Qatar in 2016 is about the size Emirates was in 2010. Emirates has doubled in size between 2010 and 2016. Etihad has pursued partner growth. There are signs of pressure: ASK growth has outpaced RPK growth in 15 of the 17 months since Oct-2014, and load factors are falling to lows not seen in recent years.
In a fast-growth region like the Middle East breaking records is the norm. Unsurprisingly, the region's three hub airports – Dubai International, Doha and Abu Dhabi – posted record traffic in 2015. Dubai International further widened its lead over London Heathrow as the world's busiest airport for international traffic. It is the third busiest overall, behind Atlanta and Beijing Capital, where traffic is predominantly domestic. Abu Dhabi posted an additional 3.4 million passengers (+17%) and Doha 4.6 million (+17%). Although Abu Dhabi and Doha are collectively 68% the size of Dubai, together they added more passengers (8 million) than Dubai (7.5 million, +11%).
Now the region has the challenge of maintaining growth despite increasing taxes and fees. On 30-Mar-2016 Dubai announced a new AED35 (USD9.53) departure fee. It will be the only fee currently imposed on transfer passengers and Dubai could generate significant millions of dollars from it in 2016. Abu Dhabi and Doha have not increased charges: preserving the status quo could be a differentiator, or, they could succumb to the lure of "easy" cash as Gulf governments look for new revenue sources.
The market between Australia and the Gulf witnessed significant strategic developments in Mar-2016. Emirates launched a non-stop Dubai-Auckland flight, taking the mantle of world's longest flight. Significantly, Emirates beat Qatar Airways to it. Qatar's public musing in Jan-2016 about opening a Doha-Auckland service prompted Emirates to put on the Auckland flight at short notice: the service was announced a week after Qatar's mention and flown a mere five weeks later.
Qatar was looking to have another oneworld one stop option between Auckland and Europe, as well as looking to boost its presence in the region, where it has significantly lagged Emirates and Etihad. Emirates' Auckland non-stop has indirectly seen Emirates cancel Panama City service, which was less strategically important and believed to be encountering difficulties as Lufthansa tried to prevent Copa from codesharing with Emirates.
The second development was Qatar Airways' long-awaited service to Sydney. Combined with an Adelaide flight in May-2016, Qatar's size in Australia will double in 2016. Qatar is now considering – traffic rights permitting – a second daily Sydney flight and a new service to Brisbane. The growth disrupts what Etihad, but especially Emirates, were hoping would be a cooling of Gulf-Australia capacity after years of fast growth.