Rome Fiumicino Airport
- CAPA Analysis
- Schedule Analysis
- Route Maps
- Print Summary
- IATA Code
- ICAO Code
- Other airports serving Rome
- Rome Ciampino Airport
- 3309m x 45m
3900m x 60m
3900m x 60m
- Airlines currently operating to this airport with scheduled services
- Aegean Airlines
Air Europa Lineas Aereas
Azerbaijan Airlines AZAL
Belle Air Europe
Blue Panorama Airlines
China Eastern Airlines
CSA Czech Airlines
Darwin Airline / Etihad Regional
Delta Air Lines
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Middle East Airlines
Norwegian Air Shuttle
Rossiya - Russian Airlines
Royal Air Maroc
Ukraine International Airlines
Wizz Air Ukraine
- Airlines currently operating to this airport via codeshare
All Nippon Airways
China Southern Airlines
Cubana de Aviacion
LOT Polish Airlines
South African Airways
Operated by Aeroporti di Roma, Leonardo da Vinci-Fiumicino Airport is the main international gateway to Rome and the busiest airport in Italy. Hosting domestic, regional and international passenger and cargo services for over 45 airlines, the airport is a major hub for Alitalia, Air Alps and Blu-Express.
Location of Rome Fiumicino Airport, Italy
Ground Handlers servicing Rome Fiumicino Airport
775 total articles
47 total articles
Air Canada’s low-cost carrier Rouge is ratcheting up service to leisure destinations in Europe during the 2014 summer high season, which should prove a definitive test for the carrier’s theory that a low cost operation on routes producing softer yields is the correct equation to turn profits.
The growth and operation of Air Canada Rouge to a possible fleet of 50 aircraft is a strategic pillar of the company’s efforts to cut its unit costs by 15% – quite a formidable goal. Similar to Rouge’s initial roll-out of service from Toronto to Athens, Edinburgh and Venice and from Montreal to Athens, most of Rouge’s planned route expansion during 2014 is into markets that have been served by Air Transat during the high season. With just a few months of operations under its belt, no clear-cut conclusions can be made about Rouge’s future or the total effects on Air Transat, but Air Canada appears to be throwing down the competitive gauntlet, noting that it is now in a much better position to compete on those routes.
Alitalia had another bad start to the year. Its 1H2013 net loss, reported on 26-Sep-2013, was EUR93 million worse than the same period last year and it faces the real prospect of running out of funds before the year end.
Only eight months after requesting an emergency loan from shareholders, its Board will seek a EUR100 million capital increase at a shareholders’ meeting on 14-Oct-2013. 25% owner Air France-KLM has signalled opposition to this plan and this sum may not even be sufficient beyond the short term.
Alitalia’s 2013-2016 industrial plan, announced only in Jul-2013, aims for breakeven at the net profit level in 2015. This will not be worth the paper it’s written on if Alitalia does not manage to raise survival funds quickly. The Italian government, although not a shareholder, is reported to be talking to Italian banks about additional loan finance. If Alitalia’s short term needs can be met, this could give vital breathing space for a long term solution to be found, possibly involving new shareholders. But more "last chances" cannot be anticipated.
Beijing Airport remains on the brink of becoming the world's largest airport, Dubai International Airport is fastest growing, rising to fifth place worldwide, while Madrid and Rome Fiumicino languish.
It is interesting to compare IATA’s recently revised global traffic demand projections for 2013 with those airports that offered the greatest amount of seat capacity in 2012 and 1H2013 (to end June) and with those airports that are preparing for traffic increases by constructing additional infrastructure.
IATA upgraded its global outlook for the airline industry at the beginning of Jun-2013.
It now predicts revenues for the year will hit USD711 billion, with airline industry profits to rise from USD10.6 billion to USD12.7 billion with a net margin of 1.8% and a return on invested capital of 4.8%.
In Part 1 of our report on the Alitalia Group’s 2013-2016 Industrial Plan, we considered the first two of four strategies identified: the redefinition of the roles of Alitalia and Air One on short/medium haul and the expansion of its intercontinental activities. In Part 2, we attempt to assess its objectives around the other two elements of the Plan, on which it has given fewer details.
These two areas are collaboration with infrastructure partners (including a focus on intermodal connections with high speed rail) and the development of its MilleMiglia loyalty programme. In identifying high speed rail and the opportunities presented by better exploitation of its FFP as strategic priorities, Alitalia has shown some innovative thinking.
However, its profit targets to 2016 are far from ambitious and the Plan needs reinforcement if it is to become the much needed catalyst to provoke more radical change that is necessary to restore Alitalia’s competitiveness.
On 3-Jul-2013, the loss-making Alitalia Group announced its new industrial plan for 2013-2016. It includes refocusing the different roles of Alitalia and Air One, growing intercontinental activities, developing infrastructure partnerships and extracting more value from the group’s frequent flyer programme.
Possibly the most significant outcome is that it should buy time for the Group’s new CEO Gabriele Del Torchio, appointed in Apr-2013. Seeking cash from an increase in a convertible loan from shareholders and from other sources before the end of 2013, it holds out the promise of a return to a positive net result in 2016.
In Part 1 of our report on the Alitalia Group’s new plan, we assess its strategic decision to redefine the roles of Alitalia and Air One and to develop its intercontinental activities. In Part 2, we will look at its strategies around collaboration with infrastructure partners and analyse is financial targets.
As American and US Airways move to close their merger in Jul-2013 and set out on a complex integration process, speculation over the status of the nine hubs comprising the backbone of the combined network was revived after a report from a US government watchdog questioned Philadelphia’s role in the combined network. Similar queries have also arisen over the status of Phoenix once integration is complete.
The network optimisation that occurs during a merger integration inevitably results in some service cuts and eliminations as unprofitable flights are culled. Southwest has been weeding out AirTran’s unviable routes for the last year (notably, without a huge amount of criticism) as it attempts to complete integration of the two carriers.
While it is natural to assume some hubs might lose prominence in the combined American-US Airways network, the reality is that during the last few years all the major American carriers have undergone network overhauls that resulted in concentrating flying at their hub strongholds, leveraging strength where they have a commanding presence. US Airways and American have notably embraced that strategy, evidenced by US Airways placing 99% of its flying at its Charlotte, Philadelphia, Phoenix and Washington National hubs while American continually touts its cornerstone strategy that entails building its network around Dallas/Fort Worth, Chicago, Los Angeles, Miami and New York.