Copenhagen Kastrup Airport
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- Roskilde Airport
- 3300m x 45m
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3070m x 45m
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- Adria Airways
Air Europa Lineas Aereas
China Cargo Airlines
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- Air Austral
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All Nippon Airways
China Eastern Airlines
China Southern Airlines
South African Airways
Copenhagen Kastrup Airport is the main international gateway to Copenhagen and the Oresund region in Denmark and is operated by Copenhagen Airports A/S. Hosting domestic, regional and international passenger and cargo services for over 30 airlines, Copenhagen Kastrup is the major hub for airlines including Scandinavian Airline System (SAS), Transavia, Cimber Sterling and Norwegian Air Shuttle.
Location of Copenhagen Kastrup Airport, Denmark
Copenhagen Airports share price
Ground Handlers and Cargo Handlers servicing Copenhagen Kastrup Airport
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Fuel & Oil Suppliers servicing Copenhagen Kastrup Airport
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1,508 total articles
Danish Travel Authority: Aircraft experiences near collison with drone at Copenhagen Kastrup Airport
58 total articles
Cathay Pacific remains attached to its premium business model, which in 1H2015 showed some improvements from a low base while profits from subsidiaries and associates – namely an unhedged Air China – greatly helped the bottom line. "We must be doing something right," chairman John Slosar said.
But the going is getting tough. A 12% decrease in fuel net of hedging losses was largely passed on to consumers with a 9% decrease in yields, although there is some impact from foreign exchange. Premium long haul demand remains soft. Cathay's recipe for relying on efficiency improvements could be reaching a ceiling: aircraft utilisation may be tempered to address growing congestion while load factor is at 86%. A350s, and later, 777Xs bring improvements but other gains will be precious. Cathay must rely on incremental improvements to remain ahead of competitors that have better geography and bigger local markets. Restructuring of China's bloated state-owned airlines was once a fantasy but is now coming into focus, a concern for Cathay.
Ryanair's customer refocus delivers 1Q load factor and 25% profit rises; Germany the next big target
Ryanair has continued its impressive growth with a 25% increase in net profit and a 15% increase in passenger numbers in 1Q of its FY2016. This is more evidence of the success of its 'Always Getting Better' customer service initiatives. Profit growth was helped by lower fuel prices, although the benefit was limited by fuel hedging at last year's higher prices driven in part by another jump in load factor. More significantly, a jump in load factor more than offset lower average fares to drive up revenue per seat.
With 35 aircraft deliveries in FY2016 and 50 in FY2017, Ryanair continues to add to its network. The coming winter will see it open bases in Berlin Schoenefeld and Gothenburg. It is also in talks with many other airports across Europe that are interested in the traffic growth that Ryanair can bring. The strength of its network is such that it can happily continue to serve former bases by serving them from other airports, as demonstrated by its recent decision to close its Copenhagen base.
In Part 1 of this CAPA report on Norwegian Air International's application for a US foreign carrier permit, we discussed the policy debate that this has unleashed. We suggested that those opposing NAI were motivated by a desire to raise anti-competitive barriers against a new and more efficient business model.
This second part of our report looks at Norwegian's impact on the incumbents' traffic on its US routes, particularly on the five city pairs where there is at least one direct competitor that is calling on the US Department of Transportation (DOT) to deny NAI's application. Two thirds of Norwegian's US routes, accounting for almost half of its US seats and frequencies, are new markets.
Our analysis of data from OAG Traffic Analyser suggest that, on Norwegian's New York routes from the three Scandinavian capitals, it has both taken traffic from existing participants and stimulated market growth. On London to New York and Los Angeles, its smaller size and a market contraction make its impact less clear, but it is probably also attracting new traffic in addition to starting to take market share.
China started 2015 with five of its airlines flying long haul. By the end of the year, the number will be seven – the same number of airlines across all of North America that fly long haul. Following Xiamen Airlines' 787 services to Amsterdam and Sydney, HNA's Beijing Capital Airlines plans to open services to Europe in Sep-2015. Limited Copenhagen service is planned to be served from Hangzhou and Beijing while Helsinki will be served from Beijing only. Capital Airlines' 54 Airbus narrowbody aircraft will reportedly be joined by three A330s by the end of the year. More international flying – and domestic services – can be expected to make efficient use of the new widebody fleet.
Capital Airlines has a mixture of scheduled and charter services. Under HNA's complex ownership structure, Capital Airlines is part of HNA Tourism, which could generate group benefits from Capital Airlines' expected quasi-charter flights. Most other HNA-affiliated carriers – from Hainan Airlines to West Air to Aigle Azur – are under HNA Aviation. While flagship group carrier Hainan Airlines focuses on North American flying with 787s, Capital Airlines could be used to explore other markets and ultimately be a test case for long-haul service from other mainland HNA carriers, of which there are many.
Finnair is raising the competitive stakes in using its Helsinki hub to offer the quickest connections between Europe and Asia and in 2015 will have about 10 flights a day to North and Southeast Asia. Before Finnair arrived in Asia in 1976, there was SAS, which commenced Asian flights in 1949 and held the title for all sorts of records and unique operations. But Finnair started to catch up, and it – not SAS – was the first to fly non-stop from Europe to China. A decade ago, Finnair had only a slight edge over SAS in Asia but now Finnair has three times the number of flights and four times as many seats as SAS in Asia.
Strong and active unions and an unwieldy ownership structure, together with an inefficient fleet, have hobbled SAS, but it is hoping to make some inroads in Asia, although opportunities will be limited. A new Stockholm-Hong Kong service opens in Sep-2015 while a nascent partnership with Etihad lays the groundwork for closer cooperation in the future and when Etihad commences services to Scandinavia. Emirates and Qatar already serve the region. SAS' Asian network is largely out of Copenhagen, and the airline probably would hope the Stockholm departure for Hong Kong will limit Finnair's poaching of Swedish traffic.
SAS fell back into net loss in FY2014 and its operating profit margin was only 1.0%. It is achieving its cost reduction targets and moving towards a more effcient operation. Moreover, product and network initiatives have helped to stimulate load factor improvements and growth in the number of frequent flyer members using the airline.
However, in a highly competitive market-place characterised by capacity growth and downward price pressure, unit cost did not fall enough to offset the drop in unit revenue. SAS has now announced further cost savings plans and is reorganising its regional flying activities.
SAS has achieved much over the past two years, streamlining the group and cutting costs. It has lowered its CASK by 10% since 2012, bringing it more in line with other European FSCs. The problem is that the main competitive threat comes from the LCCs and SAS' cost base is still much higher than theirs. It seems it must always work harder just to tread water.