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- Hangar 89, London Luton Airport,
- Main hub
- London Gatwick Airport
- United Kingdom
- Business model
- Low Cost Carrier
- Domestic | International
- Airline Group
- Part of EasyJet plc
- Association Membership
easyJet is one the largest low-cost carriers in Europe, operating on over 600 routes via its primary hub at London Gatwick Airport. Utilising an extensive fleet of more than 200 A320 aircraft, the carrier operates operates an extensive network throughout Europe as well as to northern Africa and Israel. easyJet is part of easyJet PLC, and is listed on the London Stock Exchange.
Location of easyJet main hub (London Gatwick Airport)
easyJet share price
LCCs will continue to evolve into hybrids of the original core model. CAPA and OAG consider easyJet fits the LCC profile and it is included in our reporting on this basis. Please note: when reporting for an airline is changed from or to LCC the historical data is not affected and it can lead to a distortion in the current reported data. Contact us if you have any queries.
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Over 20 years the responses of Europe's big three legacy groups to the short/medium haul LCC revolution have all been through phases of denial, submission, retreat, and counter-attack.
Now all three now have a more clearly defined LCC strategy than in the past. IAG, with Vueling and Iberia Express, has the largest, most pan-European and most profitable LCC, helping the group to grow its short/medium haul traffic. The Lufthansa and Air France-KLM LCCs are more defensive, to preserve market share. Both have only recently started LCC bases outside their original home markets. Lufthansa (after a false start with high cost Germanwings, now transferring to Eurowings) has replaced mainline capacity with LCC capacity, route-for-route. Air France-KLM has grown Transavia while cutting mainline capacity, but without substitutions route-for-route.
Only Lufthansa has taken its LCC onto long haul routes, albeit on a limited scale. Facing the more complex challenges on long haul, all three are developing a growing range of partnerships with other airlines. They have also sought to improve labour productivity in their legacy network airlines, with varying degrees of success, but again led by IAG. A next step may even be to connect with their arch rivals.
Ryanair achieved another strong increase in net profit in FY2016, following up on FY2015's 66% growth with a 43% gain. Passenger growth accelerated to 18% – its highest rate for seven years, helped in no small measure by a second successive 5ppt gain in load factor, taking it to 93%.
This was achieved with only a 1% fall in average fares, demonstrating the success of the customer service and network improvements that Ryanair has introduced over the past two years under its 'Always Getting Better' programme. Overall, Ryanair managed the rare combination of an increase in revenue per seat and a fall in cost per seat (although the latter owed much to lower fuel prices). This gave it its highest operating margin since FY2005.
Looking into FY2017, Ryanair expects profit growth to slow down, but at a figure around 13% it still aims for a double-digit rate. Moreover, it is likely to retain its position as the airline with Europe's highest operating margin.
Most airlines in Europe make losses in the winter. It was a sign of the strength of easyJet's business model and the success of CEO Dame Carolyn McCall's leadership that its 1H loss (Oct to Mar, coinciding with the winter) narrowed every year from FY2011 until it made a profit in 1H2015. Alas, its return to loss in 1H2016 puts it back among most airlines in this respect.
The airline's FY2016 outlook is slightly more positive; all its profits come in 2H, the summer, and modest earnings growth is expected. Moreover, its high margins set it apart from most airlines, as does its plan to pay 50% of net profit as dividends to shareholders.
The deterioration in easyJet's 1H result was due to falling unit revenue – a persistent problem. In spite of lower fuel prices, cost per seat did not fall fast enough in 1H to offset this. Revenue per seat was adversely affected by geopolitical events and currency movements, but it is becoming increasingly apparent that easyJet faces a challenge to grow its revenue per seat. Its load factor is already about as high as it can get, and easyJet is currently unable to drive pricing up.
Geneva Airport is one of the two major gateways into Switzerland, along with Zürich Airport. It is the one closest to the eastern part of France, actually straddling the boundary with that country. Mainly a point-to-point airport hosting O&D traffic, it does have a minor hub role; however, that responsibility falls mainly to Zürich Airport where the airline Swiss – a member of the Lufthansa Group and the Star Alliance – has much greater capacity.
Geneva Airport is in competition with other Swiss airports such as Zürich and the transnational Europort (Basel) but also with the French airport of Lyon, around 150 km distant by road, and, to a lesser degree those at Turin and Milan in Italy.
Intriguingly, Geneva Airport has recently let it be known that it has submitted a bid in the privatisation of Lyon St Exupéry Airport in France, in what would be its first venture into foreign airport management if it were successful.
This report examines Geneva Airport by way of several sets of metrics, comparing the airports that are rivals to it, and examining its construction activities and ownership.
Reports that easyJet may be considering a bid for Monarch Airlines could herald a much anticipated wave of consolidation in Europe's LCC segment. The CEOs of both Lufthansa Group and Air France-KLM have indicated that they expect consolidation, while IAG has previously been active in this field, by acquiring Vueling in 2013.
This report compares the market structure of Europe's LCC segment with that of North America and considers the prospects for consolidation among European low cost airlines. As with the broader market, Europe's LCC segment is more fragmented than North America's. However, viewed as a market in its own right, it is more concentrated than the broader European market.
The two leading LCCs, Ryanair and easyJet, have almost half of all intra-Europe LCC seats between them (but Southwest has more than 60% of intra-North America LCC seats on its own). Notwithstanding speculation about easyJet and Monarch, whose Europe seat share is only 2%, any meaningful LCC consolidation in Europe seems more likely to involve second-tier LCCs. This may include the LCC subsidiaries of the legacy groups, although none of the big three appear ready to lead the process currently.
Part one of this report on European airline market structure and consolidation highlighted that the top twenty airline groups in Europe hold 75% of seats. This is the same share as the top six groups in North America. This equivalence, in market share terms, between Europe's top 20 and North America's top six underlines the huge gap in consolidation progress between the two regions' airlines. It would take a large number of merger and acquisition deals to recreate North America's market structure in Europe, consolidating 20 into six.
This second part of the report is a kind of fantasy, a hypothetical. It suggests an illustrative series of combinations among Europe's top 20 that would approximately replicate the market shares, in terms of seat share, held by North America's top six.
This would require large merger and acquisition transactions involving pairings between members of Europe's smaller top six of Lufthansa Group, IAG, Ryanair, Air France-KLM, Turkish Airlines and easyJet. It would also mean several deals involving second-tier FSCs and LCCs. However, for now the larger deals in Europe remain relatively unlikely, and there are even hurdles to the smaller deals.