- CAPA Analysis
- Schedule Analysis
- Cargo Analysis
- Route Maps
- Fast Fact Report
- Airline Status
- IATA Code
- ICAO Code
- Corporate Address
- 4333 Amon Carter Boulevard
United States of America
- Main hub
- Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport
- United States of America
- Business model
- Full Service Carrier
- Domestic | International
- Airline Group
- Part of American Airlines Group Inc.
- Frequent Flyer Programme
- Joined Alliance
- Association Membership
- Codeshare Partners
- Air Tahiti Nui
American Airlines is a wholly-owned airline subsidiary of American Airlines Group Incorporated. With hubs in Charlotte, Chicago, Dallas/Fort Worth, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Washington DC and Tokyo, American Airlines operate an extensive network including domestic and regional services within North America and international services to Europe, Asia Pacific, Central America and South America. The carrier was incorporated from The Aviation Corporation, formed into American Airlines in 1934. The carrier was the founding member of the oneworld Alliance, and introduced SABRE in 1959.
Following the merger of AMR Corporation and US Airways Group in 2013, US Airways integrated with American Airlines under a single Air Operators Certificate (AOC). The companies have already been using a single booking system and operating as a single brand since 17-Oct-2015. US Airways Group and US Airways ceased to exist as a separate entity effective 30-Dec-2015. As a result of the merger, all property, rights, privileges, powers and franchises of US Airways became American's, as well as all of US Airways' debts, liabilities and duties.
Location of American Airlines main hub (Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport)
American Airlines Group Inc. share price
6,702 total articles
586 total articles
Spirit Airlines’ top priorities for 2016 are: improving its dismal operations after regularly underperforming the industry, and engendering a more positive relationship with its customers. The results so far are relative. Its on-time performance and customer complaint ratios have improved, yet Spirit's ranking remains near the bottom among airlines whose operational metrics are tracked by the US government. Nevertheless, Spirit is pleased with its progress so far.
Spirit acknowledges its operational performance will never rise to the level of some of the top performers in the US; but it believes that the progress it has made during the country’s busy summer high season will continue into autumn 2016, and the improvement will bolster its ULCC model over the long term.
Spirit’s unit revenue performance during the past year has shown that the ULCC model is not immune from the industry yield pressure that has stubbornly hovered over the US domestic revenue environment during that time. While the market place does remain competitive, Spirit is starting to see encouraging signs of capacity restraint among higher-cost airlines.
International passenger numbers for the Mexican low cost airline Interjet skyrocketed more than 50% in the first seven months of 2016, reflecting the launch of more than 10 new international routes during that period, and with US transborder routes representing the bulk of Interjet’s international expansion.
Interjet is no doubt positioning itself to seize on opportunities created by a new, finalised bilateral between the US and Mexico that lifts restrictions on the number of airlines operating on specific routes between the two countries. Interjet’s rival Volaris has also grown its US transborder passengers in 2016, but it has a different route profile from that of Interjet. Generally, Interjet is subject to higher levels of competition on some of its transborder routes than Volaris, given that Interjet and Volaris offer different products to their passengers.
During the past two to three years Interjet and Volaris have been essentially tied for the coveted position of Mexico’s second largest domestic airline. But for the seven months ending Jul-2017 Volaris logged 22% domestic passenger growth, while Interjet’s passenger numbers inched down slightly, resulting in Volaris assuming full command of the second place ranking.
The three large US global network airlines – American, Delta and United – are all at different phases of their respective balance sheet evolutions. Delta is enjoying its newly minted status of reaching investment grade according to two ratings agencies; United has decided to expand its level of shareholder returns after lagging its peers in that metric during its still ongoing merger integration. Even after recently deferring some Airbus widebody orders, American remains in the middle of a significant fleet revamp. The company is also still completing certain facets of its merger integration with US Airways, which is one driver for American’s larger cash balances compared with its global network peers.
Each of the three airlines seems to be striving for the right balance of investment in their businesses – maintaining a robust balance sheet and delivering ample shareholder returns. The difference is in the strategies followed.
During the last three years Delta Air Lines has been steadily expanding at Boston Logan International airport – a strategic focus city for jetBlue Airways that serves as its second largest base. Delta’s latest additions from Boston include a mix of business and leisure markets, including the highly competitive route to San Francisco.
As Boston’s largest airline, jetBlue works towards its goal of 150 daily departures from the airport, Delta has declared that it will reach 90 daily peak day departures from the airport by Jun-2017. Delta is also touting its level of first class cabin offerings from Boston as jetBlue expands its Mint premium product on routes from the airport. However, Delta’s first class offerings do not feature the same flatbed experience as Mint offers.
Delta has hinted at further expansion from jetBlue’s Boston stronghold. The scope of Delta’s plans for the airport remains unknown, but lucrative corporate markets and leisure routes with little competition appear to be Delta’s preference for the foreseeable future. Boston is not likely to become a huge battleground, but Delta aims to grow its presence in the market for the benefit of itself and its joint venture partners.
Just as the magnet of airline profitability is attracting investors, the same magnetic fields are proving to be irresistible forces for labour. As a consequence, some major US airlines remain bogged down in contentious labour negotiations that have resulted in a swarm of negative publicity for those companies. The management teams of airlines such as Southwest Airlines and Delta are attempting to navigate the conclusion of labour deals that offer fair compensation and benefits to employees, while at the same time making declarations to shareholders and investors about a transformed industry delivering consistent and record profits.
The continuing labour turbulence for Delta, Southwest and Hawaiian reflects the impatience of employees, anxious not to be left behind as airline profits grow. Those airlines face the challenge of negotiating contracts that reward labour for its contribution to stable profitability, while also ensuring that the productivity in those agreements creates a minimum level of cost inflation.
Stakes are high for both management and labour in the current round of contract negotiations, which means that collective bargaining could drag on for many months. As airline executives continue to reiterate their desire to reach new contracts, labour’s rhetoric for market rate pay is growing stronger.
(Note: this report was compiled prior Southwest Airlines reaching a tentative agreement with management on 29-Aug-2016)
Qantas on 24-Aug-2016 delivered its second consecutive AUD1 billion annual profit, indicating that the long restructuring under the tenure of CEO Alan Joyce has not only worked but created a stronger Qantas. The group has weathered the boom and bust of the Australian resource economy and times with Asian LCC JVs; has turned Gulf and Chinese competitors into partners; and has risen above a key competitor's influx of foreign shareholding, which fuelled an unsustainable capacity and product war.
The question for Qantas is what next. Domestic has returned to a comfortable duopoly and growth is on the wane, while international partners will contribute higher growth by putting passengers onto the domestic Qantas network. Loyalty, a stable business, is growing and profitable but does not capture Mr Joyce's passion. Internationally, North America is Qantas' anchor. The continent accounts for one third of Qantas' now profitable international capacity. Qantas and its proposed partner American Airlines dominate, holding 42% of the Australia/New Zealand-North America market. It is a profitable but not very emotional business, although it could move to new 787-9 routes to Dallas or Chicago. Where Qantas remains strategically keen is to Asia and Europe, where its historical deficiency helped rivals Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific to rise to their powerhouse status.
The competition with SIA and Cathay is longstanding but reinvigorated: SIA has reiterated its desire to operate between Australia and the US, while Qantas blames Cathay for squashing the proposed LCC Jetstar Hong Kong. Qantas may not be able to beat SIA and Cathay entirely, but for the first time in its history Qantas believes it can compete with them on cost. Qantas seeks mainline and Jetstar growth to and within Asia. Qantas is weighing a European restructuring that could result in the launch of 787-9 flights between Perth and London – the first nonstop flight between Australia and Europe. Qantas may not be as big as it used to be, but it is smarter, more agile and more profitable. Qantas has evolved, but its competitors appear less stable. This is a time to seize momentum and rebuild Qantas' flagship status.