- CAPA Analysis
- Schedule Analysis
- Cargo Analysis
- Route Maps
- Airport Charges
- Fast Fact Report
- IATA Code
- ICAO Code
- Corporate Address
- P.O. Box 100, 2061 Gardermoen
- Domestic | International
- Airport Type
- Other airports serving Oslo
- Oslo Moss Rygge Airport
Oslo Sandefjord Airport
- 2950m x 45m
3600m x 45m
- Airlines currently operating to this airport with scheduled services
- Aegean Airlines
Danish Air Transport
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA
Pakistan International Airlines
Thomas Cook Airlines Scandinavia
- Airlines currently operating to this airport via codeshare
- Adria Airways
All Nippon Airways
China Southern Airlines
Delta Air Lines
South African Airways
Oslo Airport, Gardermoen, is an international airport serving the largest and capital city in Norway, Oslo. Oslo Airport is wholly-owned by Avinor and is a major hub of aviation activity in Scandinavia, second only in traffic to Copenhagen airport. Oslo is served by over 35 airlines from across Europe, the Middle East, North America and Asia. SAS and Norwegian Air Shuttle are major operators at Oslo.
Location of Oslo Airport, Norway
Ground Handlers and Cargo Handlers servicing Oslo Airport
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Fuel & Oil Suppliers servicing Oslo Airport
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712 total articles
25 total articles
In late Aug-2015, Norwegian signed an agreement for two additional Boeing 787-9 orders. This brings its total on order for the variant to 11, to add to the eight 787-8 aircraft already in its wide body fleet. Its long haul network is strongly skewed towards the US, with five destinations and eight routes, versus one destination (Bangkok) and three routes in the rest of the world. In spite of the delay in receiving a US foreign carrier permit for its Ireland-based subsidiary Norwegian Air International, its long haul focus looks set to remain in the US. Indeed, this may now be because of the delay.
Meanwhile, SAS remains the largest carrier between Scandinavia and the US and has actually grown its North Atlantic network since Norwegian's entry in 2013. The losers on Scandinavia-US have been United and Delta, a situation highlighted by United's recent decision to join Delta in serving this market on a seasonal summer basis only. Both SAS and Norwegian plan new US routes from Scandinavia in what has become a near duopoly with clearly differentiated participants.
In Part 1 of this CAPA report on Norwegian Air International's application for a US foreign carrier permit, we discussed the policy debate that this has unleashed. We suggested that those opposing NAI were motivated by a desire to raise anti-competitive barriers against a new and more efficient business model.
This second part of our report looks at Norwegian's impact on the incumbents' traffic on its US routes, particularly on the five city pairs where there is at least one direct competitor that is calling on the US Department of Transportation (DOT) to deny NAI's application. Two thirds of Norwegian's US routes, accounting for almost half of its US seats and frequencies, are new markets.
Our analysis of data from OAG Traffic Analyser suggest that, on Norwegian's New York routes from the three Scandinavian capitals, it has both taken traffic from existing participants and stimulated market growth. On London to New York and Los Angeles, its smaller size and a market contraction make its impact less clear, but it is probably also attracting new traffic in addition to starting to take market share.
Norwegian's 2014 losses marked a dramatic slump after seven years of net profits (five years of operating profit). There had been some warning signals in 2013, when Norwegian's profits declined versus 2012, due to rapid capacity expansion, the launch of its first long-haul routes, delays to Boeing 787 deliveries and a very price competitive market place.
In 2014, most of these factors continued to weigh on Norwegian, for whom the weakening of the NOK was an additional challenge. A difficult year always seemed likely. Nevertheless, the size of its loss was worse than expected. Unit cost reduction failed to keep pace with the drop in unit revenues.
After another year of debt-fuelled fast capacity growth in 2014, Norwegian will take something of a breather in 2015, when its growth will be much more cautious. This should help unit revenues, but its 2015 CASK target suggests that it does not expect significant cost efficiency improvements other than from lower fuel prices.
SAS yield decline outweighs cost cuts to give wider losses in 2Q. Market share versus profitability?
SAS posted another pre-tax loss in 2QFY2014 after a weak 1Q result. For 1HFY2014, its pre-tax loss before non-recurring items was more than three times that of the same period a year earlier. It continued to make good progress with its 4XNG cost reduction programme, achieved further load factor gains and improvements in labour productivity and aircraft utilisation. However, the positive effect of these factors was wiped out by plummeting yields, attributed by SAS to overcapacity in Scandinavian markets.
In response to the weakening revenue and profitability environment, SAS has announced a new cost savings target and is taking action to "win the battle for Scandinavia's frequent travellers" through improvements to its product offering. Its recent re-capitalisation gives it more time to attempt to build a sustainably profitable business, or at least one that may become part of the next phase of European consolidation (whenever that might be).
Announcing 2Q2013 net profits that were more than twice those of the same period last year, Norwegian Air Shuttle’s CEO Bjørn Kjos said: “This has been a very good quarter for Norwegian. We have finally started our long-haul flights and we have opened a new base in London”.
Unit costs fell faster than unit revenues and both will continue to fall as average sector lengths grow.
The challenge for Norwegian will be to retain some pricing power as rapid seat growth continues, thereby maintaining this balance between unit revenues and unit costs. This may not be easy given the price sensitivity of the European short/medium-haul market and the superior route networks of major long-haul competitors.
Norwegian Air Shuttle narrowed its net loss in 1Q2013 and turned its operating result around from a loss of NOK574.6 million (USD99 million) to a profit of NOK69.2 million (USD12 million). Capacity continues to grow rapidly, with ASKs up 21% (11% due to longer average sectors), but load factor dipped by 1ppt to 76%.
Nevertheless, RASK grew 2% and revenues were up 23%, while unit costs were down 8%. Further CASK reduction remains a key target and the establishment of new bases outside high wage Scandinavia, both in Europe and in Asia, provides an opportunity to lower labour costs.
Norwegian recently announced a seventh widebody route (Oslo-Fort Lauderdale) for its long-haul network, which will launch on 30-May-2013 along with Oslo-New York. Its strategy of growing long-haul operations through new routes at the expense of frequency will help it to establish a wider presence more rapidly, but will reduce the available cost efficiencies at remote bases and restrict its appeal mainly to the leisure passenger. Norwegian’s long-haul network may struggle to be profitable for some time.