KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
- CAPA Analysis
- Route Maps
- Print Summary
- IATA Code
- ICAO Code
- Corporate Address
- KLM Royal Dutch Airlines
P.O. Box 7700
1117 ZL Schiphol
- Main hub
- Amsterdam Airport Schiphol
- Business model
- Full Service Carrier
- Joined Alliance
- Association Membership
- Codeshare Partners
- Aer Lingus
Air Europa Lineas Aereas
China Eastern Airlines
China Southern Airlines
CSA Czech Airlines
Delta Air Lines
Rossiya - Russian Airlines
Based in Amsterdam, KLM is the national airline of the Netherlands. Part of the Air France-KLM Group, KLM operates an extensive network which includes services within Europe and to Asia, Africa, North America, Central and South America and the Middle East. KLM is a founding member of the SkyTeam alliance.
Location of KLM Royal Dutch Airlines main hub (Amsterdam Airport Schiphol)
813 total articles
74 total articles
Two of the European Big Three reported 1Q2013 results within two days, so we can’t resist a comparison. Air France-KLM’s quarterly operating loss of EUR530 million was EUR171 million below Lufthansa’s. Air France-KLM shaved net debt from EUR6.0 billion at the end of 2012 to EUR5.9 billion; Lufthansa’s net debt is less than one third of this. AF-KLM’s 1Q RASK grew by 1.2%; Lufthansa’s by 2.8%.
Air France-KLM makes losses in Europe, where Lufthansa now claims a profit. In an attempt to fix this, Air France-KLM has Transavia for some leisure routes, Hop for French regional point-to-point and some hub feed, Air France’s provincial bases strategy (under review) for non-hub French routes and both Air France and KLM for everything else. Lufthansa has Germanwings for non-hub routes and Lufthansa for hub feed in Germany.
For FY2013, Air France-KLM isn’t saying whether it can improve on 2012’s EUR300 million operating loss, only that it aims to cut unit costs (ex fuel and currency) and net debt, whereas Lufthansa aims to beat last year’s EUR524 million profit.
From the first US Open Skies agreement with the Netherlands in 1992, and the subsequent granting of antitrust immunity to the KLM-Northwest joint venture in 1993, the evolution of airline alliances has been rapid and far reaching. Bilateral codeshares, immunised JVs, multilateral branded global alliances, the Etihad equity alliance: why are there so many models? In the first of a series of reports based on CAPA’s recent Airlines in Transition conference in Dublin, we examine the history and evolution of airline alliances and partnerships.
After decades of strict regulation of international traffic rights post WWII, which controlled destinations, capacity, frequencies and prices, a campaign for more liberal air services agreements (ASA) between nations began to gather pace in the US from 1977. In the words of Jeffrey Shane, General Counsel, IATA and a former senior US aviation regulator, any attempt to modify an ASA was characterised by a "highly calibrated, tit-for-tat mode of negotiation".
TAM will soon defect from Star to join its sister carrier LAN in oneworld. TAP Portugal’s future alliance membership is surrounded by uncertainty until its likely renewed privatisation process is complete. These developments throw the spotlight on the strategic importance of routes from Europe to Latin America to European carriers, who dominate this market, in particular the Big Three, but TAP Portugal, Alitalia and Air Europa also have noticeable positions. The South Atlantic market is only around one fifth of the size of the North Atlantic market by RPKs. So why should Latin America matter to European airlines?
In addition to forecast passenger traffic growth rates that, while not spectacular, are still very respectable and superior to those in Europe and on the North Atlantic, Latin America is a fascinating strategic battleground for Europe’s carriers, both directly and through alliances.
It is a territory of changing alliances and emerging players and, for those that are successful, market share gains can provide significantly higher growth then the underlying market.
Nigeria-based Arik Air enters 2013 with some prospect for growth having reportedly secured a USD2 billion credit facility to fund the acquisition of additional aircraft. The carrier has also held preliminary talks with Ivory Coast national carrier Air Cote d’Ivoire to provide that nation’s domestic network.
But despite repeated announcement of new long-haul routes, the previously aggressive Arik founded in 2006 after taking over the assets of bankrupt national airline Nigeria Airways has achieved little growth in recent years. Arik harboured pretentions of becoming Western Africa’s leading airline and candidate for membership of one of the main marketing alliances but has been weighed down by debt, the lack of a clear business plan and a meddlesome government.
The carrier has capitalised on the demise of a major privately-owned competitor in Air Nigeria as well as grounding of Dana Airways following a crash, which effectively reduced the domestic market to a duopoly with Aero.
China is the world’s most populous nation and its second largest passenger aviation market with enormous growth potential in spite of some regulatory brakes. So why is it that some European countries are under-served to China by their home carriers, in particular Spain, but also Italy and the UK? It is not an easy market to serve and yields remain low, but it is a must-do market.
Air China and Lufthansa are the biggest players on Europe-China and this is reflected in the Star Alliance controlling almost half of the seats on these routes and SkyTeam’s Air France and KLM both have strong positions in Amsterdam and Paris respectively. By contrast, British Airways finds itself in the most competitive Europe-China market, the UK and without a Chinese partner.
While BA is starting a Chengdu service and increasing its Shanghai frequency from six times weekly to daily, Iberia is absent entirely from China and IAG looks very under-represented in this large and fast-growing market. In spite of Finnair carving out a successful niche, oneworld is an also-ran on Europe-China, with only a 10% share.
Air France-KLM has now reported a cumulative net loss of EUR3.8 billion since March 2008 and a loss of EUR439 million since the merger between Air France and KLM in 2004. Although operationally solid, with load factors reaching 83% in 2012, it remains financially the weakest of the big three European legacy flag carriers and at the wrong end of the scale when it comes to labour productivity. Its medium-haul passenger network and its cargo business are significant drains on its profitability.
Management has set in motion a number of initiatives to plug these drains and to improve productivity, including headcount reduction, the restructuring of its French regional bases, the reorganisation of Air France’s regional airlines into Hop, an increase in capacity for its leisure brand Transavia, a reduction in freighter capacity and the development of its alliances and partnerships.
Great news! CAPA now offers email and phone contact functionality through its partnership with Gooey. Corporate access for this feature is USD1000 per annum.