Etihad Airways reported (07-Oct-2013) total revenue increased 11% year-on-year to USD1.4 billion in 3Q2013. Passenger revenues increased 10% to USD1.03 billion, exceeding USD1 billion for the first time, and cargo revenue increased 39% to USD244 million. Revenue from codeshare and equity alliance partners increased 36% to USD247 million and partnership contributions comprised 23% of total passenger revenue for the quarter. Passenger traffic increased 11% to 3.06 million and network-wide passenger load factor reached 81%. Cargo volumes increased 41% to 132,448 tonnes. During the quarter, the airline commenced Abu Dhabi-Sana'a service; took delivery of one A320, one A330 and one Boeing 777-300ER; launched partnerships with Air Canada, Belavia, Korean Air and South African Airways; signed an agreement to manage Air Serbia; increased its stake in Virgin Australia; and progressed plans to acquire 24% of Jet Airways. [more - original PR] [more - original PR - 2]
Etihad Airways reports 11% increase in revenue in 3Q2013
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As the most conspicuous and largest, Emirates Airline often takes on its shoulders the increasingly difficult task of defending Gulf aviation. Emirates often single handedly represents the Gulf and "Middle East Big 3", in much the same way as Dubai carries regional geopolitics.
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Certainly the policies of US President Trump have hurt aviation and tourism. But Emirates' announcement of a 19% reduction in services to the United States is less about US policies and more about the nature of the market forces that started before Trump was even a serious Presidential contender.
Air Malta Part 2: cannot match LCC unit costs; Alitalia not about to invest.
Part 1 of this report on Air Malta analysed its network, capacity development, codeshare partnerships and the competitive landscape in its markets. This second part looks at its financial track record and the development of its shrinking fleet and its financial track record. It also presents an estimate of Air Malta's unit cost position and the outlook in the aftermath of the Alitalia talks.
Air Malta's majority owner, the Maltese government, initiated a search for private investors in the loss making national airline in 2015. In Apr-2016 Alitalia signed an MoU with the government over the possible acquisition of up to 49% of Air Malta, but the two airlines announced on 13-Jan-2017 that talks had ended. It seems that the financial and political risks have prevented the investment from proceeding, particularly as Alitalia is wrestling with its own restructuring.
Its unit cost is efficient compared with European legacy airlines, but remains higher than the level of the LCCs with which it competes. Its short haul, non premium, point-to-point product has little with which to differentiate itself.
Air Malta has struggled to compete profitably and has reported several years of losses. A new plan is needed, and this may include a search for an alternative investor.